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1. The definition of morality
It  is  difficult  to  offer a  simple definition of morality that  finds a  consensus  among 
philosophers, psychologists, and the many commentators in the area. Philosophers were the 
first  to  wonder  about  the  moral  life  of  humans.  One  of  the  most  eminent  thinkers  who 
addressed moral problems as the focus of his work was Hume. He argued that ‘Reason is, and 
ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to 
serve  and  obey  them‘  giving  an  important  rule  to  the  feelings  in  relation  to  the  moral 
judgment (Hume, 1739-1740/1969, p. 462). Hume saw reason as a tool used by the mind to 
obtain and process information about events in the world or about relations among objects. 
He argued that a person in full possession of reason yet lacking moral sentiment, would have 
difficulty choosing any ends or goals to pursue and would look like what we now call  a 
psychopath (Hume, 1777/1960). The social intuition model proposed by Haidt (2001) was an 
example of the Hume’s influence on psychology. Haidt’s work was oriented to emphasizing 
that quick, automatic evaluations (called intuitions) are the base of moral evaluation. Further 
he  underlies  the  importance  of  cultural  influences,  deemphasizing  the  role  of  private 
individual reasoning (Haidt, Koller, & Diaz, 1993).  
Another important philosopher who extensively wrote about morality was Kant (1785/1959). His ethical 
theory was proposed in order to give strong meaning to the primacy of rationality itself in morality. He stated 
that any rational agent could and should figure out the morally correct thing to do by applying the categorical 
imperative: ‘I should never act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should be a universal law‘ 
(1785/1959, p. 18). The Kantian approach largely influenced the way to study moral psychology taken by Piaget 
(1932),  Kohlberg (1969),  Turiel  (2006), and Hauser (2006).  Classical  research in developmental psychology 
proposed theories (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932) based on the description of different levels of children’s ability 
to justify them answers to moral scenarios. The moral development, according to this account, seems to reflect 
general cognitive development. 
During the Sixties the cognitive approach open the road to different ways of looking at moral judgment. 
Some researchers start to doubt that justification could be the core aspect of the human judgment and they argue 
that  decision,  solution,  or  other  evaluation appears  suddenly and effortlessly in  consciousness,  without  any 
awareness of the mental processes that led to the outcome (Bastick, 1982; Simon, 1992). In recent years, in the 
context of advances in brain imaging and cognitive neuroscience,  many cognitive scientists  and empirically 
oriented philosophers have turned their attention to old questions about morality. Among the issues that have 
been  actively  discussed  are:  the  nature  of  the  cognitive  mechanisms  subserving  various  aspects  of  moral 
cognition, whether those mechanisms are present early in life (Turiel, 2006), the extent which these are specified 
(Dwyer 1999, 2006; Greene & Haidt 2002; Haidt 2001; Hauser 2006; Nichols, 2004; Nichols & Mallon, 2006), 
the relation between the moral judgment and other cognitive function, for example intentionality (Knobe, 2003a, 
2003b, 2005, 2006; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006). Taken together, these questions have a great importance for 
moral psychology in general and for the developmental psychology in particular. Does the moral sense develop 
through discontinuous or rather through continuous patterns? Is mortality a specific domain? Which relations 
exist  between  morality and  other  cognitive  function  such  as  theory of  mind?  These  are  only some of  the 
questions  that  are  emerging  in  the  beginning  research  on  morality  connected  out  by  developmental 
psychologists. The aim of this thesis is to shed some light on the early ability compute information about moral 
scenarios.  In  particular  this  work  has  three  main  goals:  (1)  To  analyze  the  relation  between  intentionality 
judgments and moral evaluation in the SEE as shown by children and adults, (2) To evaluate differences between 
children and adults computation of information on measures of utilitarian moral judgments, (3). To shed light on 
the continuity vs discontinuity issue regarding moral development.
The introduction of the thesis will address crucial questions concerning moral judgment:
1.1 What is the nature of moral judgment?
1.2 How does moral reasoning develop?
1.3 Which are relationship between moral judgment and intentionality? 
The following provides a historical view of issues and the rationale for the programme of research described in 
this thesis. 
1.1 What is the nature of moral judgment?
Research on the development of moral reasoning was stimulated by Piaget’s seminar 
monograph ‘Le jugement moral chez l’enfant’ (1932). In this book, Piaget shed light on stages 
through  which  a  child  may  acquire  a  mature  moral  sense.  His  cognitive  developmental 
approach provided a conceptual framework for the study of growth of the moral thought. 
According  to  Piaget,  all  development  emerges  from  action:  individuals  construct  and 
reconstruct their knowledge of the world as a result of interactions with the environment. 
Based  on  his  observations  of  children’s  application  of  rules  when  playing,  the  Swiss 
researcher determined that morality, too, could be considered a developmental process based 
on mental structure. 
Piaget’s researches focused specifically on the moral lives of children, studying the way 
Swiss children aged 5-13 years play games in order to learn more about their beliefs about 
right and wrong. Interestingly, Piaget’s research concerned not only moral thought itself but 
also  on  how children  could  understand the  relation  between intentionality  and the  moral 
judgment, integrating information about the magnitude of damage and the information about 
the intention of an agent. Following ‘his clinical’ interviews, he asked children of different 
ages to compare short vignettes about two children. One of the story-character described as 
having produced a large negative effect (e.g., many broken cups) while performing an act 
born of positive intentions (e.g.  helping his  mother  wash up);  the other  was described as 
having produced a minor negative event (one broken cup), despite his negative intentions. The 
child was asked to decide which of the two was the naughtier. This choice was followed by an 
inquiry  into  the  reason  of  the  choice.  The  main  research  findings  showed  that  younger 
children made their choice on the basis of the outcome, whereas older children evaluated 
morally on the basis of intentions with a transition at around 7-8 years. 
From his observations and interview, Piaget, inspired by Kantian thought, concluded 
that children develop their moral sense through different level of ability: from ‘heteronomous‘ 
to a ‘autonomous’ stage. Being in the ‘heteronomous’ stage of moral reasoning means having 
a type of thought characterized by a strict adherence to rules and duties, and obedience to 
authority. This heteronomy results from two factors: (1) the child’s cognitive structure and (2) 
the child’s social relationship with adults. Concerning the first point, the author suggests that 
young children’s way of reasoning is characterized by egocentrism. In other words young 
children are unable to simultaneously take into account their own view of things with the 
perspective of someone else. This egocentrism leads them to project their own thoughts and 
wishes  onto  others.  It  is  also  associated with the  unidirectional  view of  rules  and power 
associated with ‘heteronomous’ moral thought, and various forms of ‘moral realism.‘ Moral 
realism is associated with ‘objective responsibility’. Using this expression, Piaget meant that 
children  fail  to  differentiate  among  types  of  outcomes  (an  undifferentiated  view  of 
consequences, material damage, and observable deviations) and judge by consequences rather 
than by intentions. Moral realism is also associated with the young child’s belief in ‘immanent 
justice.‘ This is the expectation that punishments automatically follow acts of wrong-doing.  
The  second  contributor  to  heteronomous  moral  thinking  in  young  children  is  their 
relative unequal social relationship with adults and the mutual influences of their peers. In the 
natural authority relationship between adults and children, power is handed down from above. 
The relative powerlessness of young children, coupled with their egocentrism, feeds into a 
heteronomous moral orientation. However, through interactions with other children in which 
the group seeks to play together in a way all find fair, children find this strict heteronomous 
adherence to rules sometimes problematic in that they must take into account peers’ point of 
view. As children consider these situations, they develop towards an ‘autonomous‘ stage of 
moral reasoning, characterized by the ability to consider rules critically, and selectively apply 
these rules based on a goal of mutual respect and cooperation. The ability to act from a sense 
of reciprocity and mutual respect is associated with a shift in the child’s cognitive structures 
from egocentrism to  perspective  taking.  Coordinating  one’s  own perspective  with  that  of 
others means that what is right needs to be based on solutions that meet the requirements of 
fair  reciprocity.  Thus,  Piaget  viewed  moral  development  as  the  result  of  interpersonal 
interactions through which individuals work out resolutions which all deem fair. 
The second important author that embraced rationalist approach to moral judgment was 
Lawrence  Kohlberg  (1969).  He  modified  and  elaborated  Piaget’s  work,  and  laid  the 
groundwork for the current debate within psychology on moral development. Consistent with 
Piaget, he proposed that children form ways of thinking through their experiences including 
understandings  of  moral  concepts  such  as  justice,  rights,  equality  and  human  welfare. 
Kohlberg proposed that the process of attaining moral maturity took longer and was more 
gradual than Piaget had proposed. His most famous task involved children as young as 10 
years, adolescent, and adults the ‘Heinz and drugs dilemma’
Heinz’s wife was dying of cancer. Doctors said a new drug might save her. The drug 
had been discovered by a pharmacist in Heinz’s town but he was charging ten times more 
than what it cost him to make. Heinz couldn’t afford to buy the drug, so he asked friends and 
relatives to lend him the money. But he only raised half the money needed. He told the 
pharmacist his wife was dying and asked him to sell the drug cheaper, or asked if he could 
pay the rest of the money later. The pharmacist said no, as he had discovered the drug and 
wanted  to  make  money  out  of  it.  Heinz  then  became  so  desperate  he  broke  into  the 
pharmacy and stole some of the drug.
Kohlberg then asked participants:
- Should Heinz have stolen the drug?
- Would it change anything if Heinz did not love his life?
-  What  if  the  person  dying  was  a  stranger,  would  it  make  any 
difference?
On the basis  of persons’ justifications  of  answers,  Kohlberg identified six stages  of 
moral reasoning grouped into three major levels. Each level represented a fundamental shift in 
the social-moral perspective of the individual. 
In the first and the second stages of moral development, grouped together in a period called 
pre-conventional  level,  moral  judgment  is  characterized  by an  individual  and  concrete 
perspective. In Stage 1 (obedience and punishment), children focus on avoiding breaking 
rules that produce punishment. Children obey its own sake and try to avoid the physical 
consequences of punishment for harm to persons and property. As in Piaget’s framework, 
Stage  1  reasoning  is  characterized  by  ego-centrism  and  an  inability  to  consider  the 
perspectives of others. At Stage 2 (self interest),  there is the early emergence of moral 
reciprocity. The major rule becomes, ‘If someone hits you, you hit them back.‘ This stage 
focuses on the instrumental, pragmatic value of an action. At Stage 2, children follow the 
rules only when it is to advance someone’s immediate interests. What is right is what’s fair 
in  the  sense  of  an  equal  exchange,  a  deal,  an  agreement.  At  Stage  2,  there  is  an 
understanding that everybody has his (her) own interest to pursue and these conflicts, so 
that right is relative (in the concrete individualist sense).
The second period proposed by Kohlberg was the conventional level. Children in 
this  level  are  characterized  by  a  basic  understanding  that  norms  and  conventions  are 
necessary to uphold society. They tend to be self-identified with these rules, and uphold 
them consistently, viewing morality as acting in accordance with what society defines as 
right. In Stage 3 (interpersonal accord and conformity) individuals are aware of shared 
feelings,  agreements,  and  expectations  which  take  primacy  over  individual  interests. 
Persons define what is right in terms of what is expected by people close to one’s self, and 
in terms of the stereotypic roles that  define being good -  e.g.,  a good brother,  mother, 
teacher. Being good means keeping mutual relationships, such as trust, loyalty, respect, and 
gratitude. The perspective is that of the local community or family. There is not as yet a 
consideration  of  the  generalized  social  system.  In  Stage  4  (authority  and  social  order 
obedience), persons are able to delineate what is right in terms of local norms and role 
expectations to defining right in terms of the laws and norms established by the larger 
social  system. This is  the ‘member of society‘ perspective in which one is morally by 
fulfilling the actual duties defining one’s social responsibilities. Those at stage 4 believe 
that must obey the law except in extreme cases in which the law comes into conflict with 
other prescribed social duties. Obeying the law is seen as necessary in order to maintain the 
system of laws which protect everyone.
Finally, the post conventional period is characterized by reasoning based on principles, 
using a ‘prior to society‘ perspective. Individuals’ reasoning is based on the principles which 
underlie rules and norms, but reject a strict application of a rule or norm. In Stage 5 (social 
contract), individuals are viewed as holding different opinions and values. Laws are regarded 
as  social contracts rather than rigid dictums. Those that do not promote the general welfare 
should  be  changed  when  necessary  to  meet  utilitarian  values  (the  greatest  good  for  the 
greatest  number  of  people).  This  is  attained  through  majority  decision,  and  inevitably 
compromise. Democratic government is ostensibly based on stage five reasoning. In Stage 6 
(universal ethical principles), moral reasoning is based on abstract reasoning using universal 
ethical  principles.  Laws are valid only insofar as they are grounded in  justice,  and that a 
commitment  to  justice  carries  with  it  an  obligation  to  disobey  unjust  laws.  Rights  are 
unnecessary as social contracts are not essential for  deontic moral action. Decisions are not 
met hypothetically in a conditional way but rather categorically in an absolute way. This can 
be  done  by imagining  what  one  would  do  being  in  anyone’s  shoes,  who imagined what 
anyone would do thinking the same. The resulting consensus is the action taken. In this way 
action is  never a means but always an end in itself;  one acts  because it  is  right,  and not 
because it is instrumental, expected, legal or previously agreed upon. While Kohlberg insisted 
that  stage six  exists,  he had difficulty in  finding  participants  who consistently used it.  It 
appears that  people rarely if  ever  reach stage six  of  Kohlberg’s  model.  Thus,  there  is  an 
understanding that elements of morality such as regard for life and human welfare transcend 
particular cultures and societies and are to be upheld irrespective of other conventions or 
normative obligations.  Despite  this  focus on moral  reasoning from a rational  perspective, 
recently there has been an increasing emphasis on the roles of emotion and intuition, whit the 
claim that justification is not the core of moral judgment.
One  person  who  extensively  underlines  the  rule  played  by  emotion  in  determining 
moral reasoning is Haidt (2001). His theory is based on the premise that even mature adults 
could  have  strong  intuitions  about  moral  action,  without  been  able  to  explain  why  and 
therefore without rational deliberation. He gave adults scenarios similar to the following:
Julie and Mark are brother and sister. They are traveling together in 
France on summer vacation from college. One night they are staying alone in 
a cabin near the beach. They decide that it would be interesting and fun if 
they tried making love. At the very least it would be a new experience for 
each of them. Julie was already taking birth control pills, but Mark uses a 
condom too, just to be safe. They both enjoy making love, but they decide 
not to do it again. They keep that night as a special secret, which makes them 
feel even closer to each other. 
What do you think about that? 
Was it OK for them to make love?
Most  people  who  read  the  above  story  immediately  say that  it  was  wrong  for  the 
siblings  to  make  love,  and  they  then  begin  searching  for  reasons  (Haidt,  Bjorklund,  & 
Murphy, 2000). They justify their answers speaking about dangers of inbreeding, about the 
possibility that someone could be hurt, and many people say something like: ‘I don’t know, I 
can’t explain it, I just know it’s wrong.‘ Observing situation like this, where even fully mature 
adults  are  sometimes unable  to  provide any sufficient  justification for strongly felt  moral 
intuitions (‘moral dumbfounding’), Haidt proposed that persons are not always use rational 
deliberation to solve moral dilemma but rather intuition. Based on these results, Haidt (2001) 
proposed ‘The social  intuitionist  model’ arguing that  fast  and automatic  intuitions are the 
primary source of moral judgments, conscious deliberations play little causal role, and that 
persons use them mostly to construct post hoc justifications for judgments that have already 
occurred. The use of the term ‘social’ reflects the role of cultural norms and culturally shaped 
emotions in having a substantial impact on the domain of morality and the process of moral 
judgment (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993). 
While the debate over the role of intuition and justification is still active, some have 
proposed a hybrid theory that links intuitionism and rationalist approaches. According to such 
account,  unconscious  emotions  and  some  form  of  principled  and  deliberate  reasoning 
regulates human’s moral life. This view has most recently  embraced by Greene with fMRI 
studies (Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, 
Darley, & Cohen, 2001) by Damasio on neurologically impaired patients (Anderson, Bechara, 
Damasio,  Tranel,  &  Damasio,  1999;  Damasio,  1994;  Koenigs,  Young,  Adolph,  Tranel, 
Cushman, Hauser, & Damasio, 2007; Tranel, Bechara, & Damasio, 2000). 
Greene el  al.,  (2001)  reported an interesting  series  of  studies  presenting fMRI data 
supporting a theory of moral judgment according to which both ‘cognitive’ and ‘emotional’ 
processes  play  crucial  and  sometimes  mutually  competitive  roles.  In  these  studies, 
participants were given scenarios similar to the following: 
The Trolley problem (Thomson, 1986):
You are at the wheel of a runaway trolley quickly approaching a fork in the 
tracks.  On  the  tracks  extending  to  the  left  is  a  group  of  five  railway 
workmen. On the tracks extending to the right is a single railway workman. 
If you do nothing the trolley will proceed to the left, causing the deaths of 
the five workmen. The only way to avoid the deaths of these workmen is to 
hit a switch on your dashboard that will cause the trolley to proceed to the 
right, causing the death of the single workman. 
Is it appropriate for you to hit the switch in order to avoid the deaths 
of the five workmen? 
The Footbrige problem (Thomson, 1986):
A runaway trolley is heading down the tracks toward five workmen who will 
be killed if the trolley proceeds on its present course. You are on a footbridge 
over  the  tracks,  in  between  the  approaching  trolley  and  the  five 
workmen. Next to you on this footbridge is a stranger who happens to be 
very large. The only way to save the lives of the five workmen is to push this 
stranger off the bridge and onto the tracks below where his large body will 
stop the trolley. The stranger will die if you do this, but the five workmen 
will be saved. 
Is it appropriate for you to push the stranger on to the tracks in order to 
save the five workmen?  
The dilemmas, first studied in philosophy, have opened up a lively debate on the nature 
utilitarian  judgment.  When  asked  to  solve  these  dilemmas,  many persons  state  that  it  is 
appropriate  to switch the direction of  the trolley in  order  to  avoid the deaths  of  the five 
workmen, but few person say that it is appropriate to push the stranger on the tracks. Why this 
asymmetry happens is still  controversial,  but some interesting information comes from an 
fMRI study. Greene et al. (2001) suggest that the crucial differences between the two dilemma 
lies in the amount of emotional salience of the dilemmas, in that the footbridge dilemma is 
‘personal’ and the trolley dilemma is ‘impersonal’. Different parts of the brain are activated 
when the dilemmas are given to the participants. In particular, ‘personal’ moral dilemmas are 
accompanied  by  brain  areas  associated  with  emotional  reasoning  while  ‘impersonal’ 
dilemmas are accompanied by the activation of areas associate with cognitive process such as 
working memory abstract reasoning, and problem solving. The findings were complemented 
by reaction time (RT) suggesting that some moral dilemmas elicit response conflicts between 
negative  emotional  responses  and  countervailing  process  (the  participants  who  judged 
‘appropriate’ the  action  to  push  the  stranger  were significantly  slower  than  responses  of 
inappropriate), which are hypothesized to be cognitive in nature. In another study, Greene et 
al. (2004) used ‘difficult personal’ moral dilemma similar to the following:
Enemy soldiers have taken your village. They have order to kill all remain 
civilians. You and some of your town people have sought to refuge in the 
cellar of a large house. Outside, you hear the voice of soldiers who have 
come to search the house for valuables. Your baby begins to cry loudly. You 
cover his mouth to block the sound. If you remove your hand from his mouth 
his crying will summon the attention of the soldiers who will kill you, your 
child, and the others hiding out in the cellar. To save yourself and the other 
you must smother your child to death. 
Is it appropriate for you to smother your child in order to save yourself and 
the other town people?
The results  show that,  while  solving this  type of conflict,  brain regions involved in 
mediating response conflicts  increased the activity.  This finding supports  the Kohlbergian 
claim that high level cognition process are used in the resolution of difficult dilemmas that 
provides a challenge Haidt’s model (2001). Further, reaction time data raises doubt about the 
possibility  that  moral  judgment  is  unreflective.  Participants’  RT  indicates  that  their 
deliberation require considerable time. These took over 10 and in some cases 20 seconds to 
complete,  even  if  participants  were  not  asked  to  explain  the  reason  of  the  choice.  The 
increased cognitive activity suggests that cognitive control processes can override emotional 
responses,  favouring  personal  moral  violations  when  the  benefits  outweigh  the  costs.  In 
summary, brain regions associated with abstract reasoning and cognitive control (including 
the dorsal  prefrontal  cortex and anterior cingulated cortex)  are  recruited to solve difficult 
personal moral dilemmas. These researches support the hypothesis that both cognitions and 
emotions play an important role in producing the moral evaluation. Research on brain damage 
show that prefrontal cortex play an important role in producing a proper moral behaviour 
(Damasio,  1994;  Koenigs,  Young,  Adolph,  Tranel,  Cushman,  Hauser,  & Damasio,  2007). 
Anderson et  al.  (1999) compared patient  with an early onset  of  brain damage (prefrontal 
cortex lesions occurring before 16 months) with adult-onset patients. The main differences 
between the two groups seem to be in defective on social and moral reasoning, suggesting that 
the acquisition of complex social conventions and moral rules have followed brain lesions. 
Some recent models propose a new view to think of morality: the nativist model. Rawls 
(1971)  proposed  that,  analogous  to  the  Chomskyan  linguistic  faculty,  humans  could  be 
endowed with unconscious moral principles. He wrote ‘A conception of justice characterizes 
our  moral  sensibility  when the  everyday judgments  we  make  are  in  accordance  with  its 
principles.’ He went on to sketch the connection to language: 
‘A useful comparison here is with the problem of describing the sense of 
grammaticalness that we have for the sentences of our native language. In this 
case, the aim is to characterize the ability to recognize well-formed sentences by 
formulating clearly expressed principles which make the same discriminations as 
the native speaker. This is a difficult undertaking which, although still unfinished, 
is known to require theoretical constructions that far outrun the ad hoc precepts of 
our  explicit  grammatical  knowledge.  A similar  situation  presumably  holds  in 
moral philosophy. There is no reason to assume that our sense of justice can be 
adequately characterized by familiar common sense precepts, or derived from the 
more  obvious  learning  principles.  A correct  account  of  moral  capacities  will 
certainly involve  principles  and theoretical  constructions  which  go beyond the 
norms and standards cited in every day life [Rawls, 1971 pp. 46-47].’
 Following Rawls’ insights (1971), Hauser (2006) proposed that our moral judgments 
are the product of unconscious psychological processes, and are thus, intuitive (Chomsky, 
1986;  Dwyer,  1999;  Dwyer,  2006;  Hauser,  2006; Mikhail,  2000).  In terms of a linguistic 
analogy, this view does not deny cultural variation. Rather, it predicts variation based on how 
each culture switches on or off particular parameters. In a recent study, Cushman, Young, and 
Hauser (2006) proposed principles that govern our moral faculty: 
The Action Principle: Harm caused by action is morally worse than equivalent harm caused 
by omission. 
The  Intention  Principle:  Harm intended  as  the  means  to  a  goal  is  morally  worse  than 
equivalent harm foreseen as the side-effect of a goal.   
The Contact Principle: Using physical contact to cause harm to another is morally worse 
than causing equivalent harm to another without physical contact. 
The  action  principle  or  ‘omission  bias’ is  well-researched  in  the  psychology literature 
(Baron  & Ritov,  2004;  Spranca,  Minsk,  & Baron,  2003).  The  relevance  of  the  action 
principle is also recognized in the philosophical literature (Quinn, 1989; Rachels, 1975). 
The intention principle or the ‘Doctrine of the Double Effect’ has received intense study by 
philosophers  (Foot,  1967;  Nagel,  1986),  but  less  by  psychologists  (Mikahil,  2002; 
Royzman & Baron, 2002). The contact principle implies that physical contact is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for a personal moral dilemma. Having established that 
subjects make use of a principle (Thomson, 1986), is possible to investigate whether this 
principle is available to conscious reflection during justification.  Cushman et al.  (2006) 
investigated these three principles by varying the crucial element of the stories (action vs 
omission, intended harm vs. side effect harm and contact vs. no contact) 
The authors proposed to participants scenarios similar to the following:
Scenario 1: Denise is a passenger on a trolley whose driver has just 
shouted that the trolley’s brakes have failed,  and who then fainted of the 
shock. On the track ahead are five people; the banks are so steep that they 
will not be able to get off the track in time. The track has a side track leading 
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off to the right, and Denise can turn the trolley onto it. Unfortunately there is 
one person on the right hand track. Denise can turn the trolley, killing the 
one; or she can refrain from turning the trolley, letting the five die. 
Test question: Is it morally permissible for Denise to switch the trolley to the side track? 
As predicted, subjects judged harmful actions as morally worse than harmful omissions 
(the Action principle), harm intended as the means to an end morally worse then harm 
foreseen as the side-effect of an end (the Intention principle), and harm involving physical 
contact  as  morally worse than  harm without  contact  (the  Contact  principle).  However, 
unlike  judgments,  subjects’ justifications  differed  greatly by principle.  The  majority of 
participants were able to provide sufficient justifications for their judgments when asked to 
evaluate the case of the action principle. Although patterns of judgments were consistent 
with terms of rational model, this was not the case for intention principle. Less than a third 
of subjects were able to provide sufficient justifications.  Consistent with an intuitionist 
model of morality subjects reliably generated a pattern of moral judgments in keeping with 
the  intention  principle,  but  were  generally  incapable  of  articulating  it,  to  the  point  of 
expressing confusion when confronted with their own judgments or even denying their 
judgments altogether. The intention principle clearly plays a role in moral judgment, but 
most likely in the form of unconscious - or at least inexpressible - knowledge. However 
with respect to justifications of responses to the Contact principle, subjects were typically 
able to articulate the relevant principle used, but unwilling to endorse it as morally valid. 
Thus, although subjects are able to articulate the principle behind their  reasoning,  they 
often reject it as morally invalid. A possible explanation is that the contact principle guides 
moral judgments according to the intuitionist model during judgment, and that a process of 
post-hoc reasoning at the justification stage allows subjects to deduce the principle behind 
their judgments. 
This analysis of the literature provides a basic outline of the different models that seek 
to explain the process of moral judgment. A crucial issue in the development of a moral sense 
concern whether there exists a stage discontinuity, as proposed by traditional rational models, 
or  more  continuous  pattern  as  proposed by intuition  and nativist  models.  In  adjudicating 
between alternative models, developmental psychology has a fundamental role in observing 
when  in  development  and  what  children  are  computing  when  asked  to  evaluate  moral 
scenarios.
1.2 How does moral reasoning develop?
Piaget (1932) and Kohlberg (1969), whose theories were summarized in the previous 
section,  posit  stage-like  discontinuities  as  a  distinctive  element  of  moral  development. 
Further,  both  authors’ conceptualize  moral  ability  as  domain  general,  in  other  words  the 
development of moral sense is determined by the general level of cognitive development. 
Their view was challenged by the domain theory advanced by Elliot Turiel and colleagues 
(Nucci, 1982; Nucci, 2001; Nucci & Turiel 1993; Nucci, Turiel,  & Encarnacion-Gawrych, 
1983;  Smetana,  1981;  Smetana,  1993;  Smetana,  Toth,  Cicchetti,  Bruce,  Kane,  & Daddis, 
1999; Turiel, 1983; 2006 ). Within Turiel’s theory, a distinction is drawn between the child’s 
developing  concepts  of  morality,  and  other  domains  of  social  knowledge,  such  as  social 
convention.  According  to  domain  theory,  the  child’s  concepts  of  morality  and  social 
convention emerge out of the child’s attempts to account for qualitatively differing forms of 
social  experience  associated  with  these  two  classes  of  social  events.  In  Turiel’s  studies, 
children were presented with dilemmas or stories which described the actions of an individual 
performing a moral transgression. Children are asked whether the actions of the protagonist 
are  wrong,  and whether  they would still  be wrong if  there  was no rule  prohibiting it.  In 
general, findings reveal that even children as young as 4 years believe that certain forms of 
behaviors (e.g.  hitting,  stealing or deceiving) are unacceptable at  all  times,  whereas other 
social  rules  (e.g.  addressing a  teacher  by her  first  name) are  situation or context  specific 
(Turiel, 1983, p.41). Due to this, the core features of moral cognition are centered around 
considerations  on the  well-being  of  persons.  Morality is  structured  by concepts  of  harm, 
welfare,  and  fairness.  In  contrast,  actions  that  are  matters  of  social  convention  have  no 
intrinsic  interpersonal  consequences.  For  example,  there  is  nothing  intrinsic  hurting  if  a 
person eats using his hands instead of the cutlery. What makes it a bad thing is the existence 
of socially agreed upon rules. These conventions, while arbitrary in the sense that they have 
no intrinsic status, are nonetheless important to the smooth functioning of any social group. 
Conventions provide a way for members of the group to coordinate their social exchanges 
through a set of agreed upon and predictable modes of conduct. Concepts of convention, then, 
are  structured  by  the  child’s  understandings  of  social  organization.  These  studies  are 
interesting especially because they are proposing a continuous and domain specific hypothesis 
about the moral development already present at two years old and independent from culture. 
Some sceptics (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 1997; Haidt et al., 1993) doubt that 
moral  judgment  has  a  universal  component  emphasizing,  the  role  played  by  social 
environment on moral evaluation. Haidt et al., (1993) showed that moral value are culturally 
driven  and suggest  that  cultural  norms and culturally shaped emotions  have a  substantial 
impact on the domain of morality and the process of moral judgment. Shweder et al., (1997) 
proposed  a  model  based  on  three  codes  of  moral  thought  and  discourse,  which  cultures 
elaborate and rely on to different degrees. In the ethics of autonomy (similar to Turiel’s moral 
domain),  the self  is  conceptualized as an individual preference structure,  and the point of 
moral regulation is to increase choice, autonomy, and control. In the ethics of community, the 
self  is  conceptualized  as  the  holder  of  an  office  or  role  in  a  larger  interdependent  and 
collective enterprise.  This code requires duty,  respect,  obedience to  authority,  and actions 
consistent with one’s gender, caste, age, or other components of social role. In the third moral 
code, the ethics of divinity, the self is conceptualized as a spiritual entity motivated to avoid 
pollution and attain purity and sanctity. Acts that are disgusting or degrading to one’s spiritual 
nature are condemned, even if they involve no harm to others. 
Recently  some  of  the  rules  proposed  by  Turiel  to  base  his  theory  started  to  be 
challenged by some new findings. In particular a study proposed by Kelly, Stich, Haley, Eng 
and Fessler (2007) provide some data showing that persons not are always displaying the 
general role that harm norm are general actions judged wrong here and now as in other times 
and in other cultures. In their study, designed to determine whether participants judged rules 
prohibiting harmful behavior to be temporally universal participants  were given scenarios 
similar to these:
A)  Three  hundred  years  ago,  whipping  was  a  common practice  in  most 
navies  and  on  cargo  ships.  There  were  no  laws  against  it,  and  almost 
everyone thought that whipping was an appropriate way to discipline sailors 
who disobeyed orders or were drunk on duty. Mr. Williams was an officer on 
a cargo ship 300 years ago. One night, while at sea, he found a sailor drunk 
at a time when the sailor should have been on watch. After the sailor sobered 
up, Williams punished the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip.        
Is it OK for Mr. Williams to whip the sailor?
B) Mr. Adams is an officer on a large modern American cargo ship in 2004. 
One night, while at sea, he finds a sailor drunk at a time when the sailor 
should have been monitoring the radar screen.  After the sailor sobers up, 
Adams punishes the sailor by giving him 5 lashes with a whip. 
Is it OK for Mr. Adams to whip the sailor?
In response to these couple of scenario 52% of participants said that it was OK to whip a drunken 
sailor 300 years ago (scenario A), but only 6% said it was OK to do it today (scenario B). Other scenarios 
were  presented  to  participants  to  determine  whether  participants  judged  rules  prohibiting  harmful 
behavior to be temporally universal. 
(A) It is against the law for teachers to spank students. Ms. Williams is a 
third grade teacher, and she knows about the law prohibiting spanking. She 
has also received clear instructions from her principal not to spank students. 
But  when a  boy in  her  class  is  very disruptive  and repeatedly hits  other 
children, she spanks him.      
Is it OK for Ms. Williams to spank the boy?
(B)  Now  suppose  that  it  was  not  against  the  law  for  teachers  to  spank 
students, and that Ms. Williams’ principal had told her that she could spank 
students who misbehave if she wanted to.      
Is it OK for Ms. Williams to spank the boy? 
Again the result were he results were quite striking: 8% of participants said it was OK 
to spank the boy in response to question (scenario A) and 48% said it was OK to spank the 
boy in response to question (scenario B).
Turiel’s  theory  cannot  explain  why  moral  rules  can  change  across  time  but  his 
conceptualization of moral ability as domain specific and continuous provides a novel means 
to conceptualize about the cognitive bases of morality. Hauser’s proposal (2006) deals again 
the issue of domain specificity and continuity on moral reasoning. This theory offers a base to 
reexamine research on children’s ability to understand moral principles from an early age and 
to discover cultural difference.
1.3 Which are relationship between moral judgment and intentionality? 
May be due to the renew attention for the moral psychology, the interest on the debate 
on the reciprocal influence of intentionality and moral judgment emerged. Throughout this 
century,  philosophers  and  psychologists  have  tried  to  explain  features  of  our  moral 
psychology by appealing to  features  of  human capacity for  understanding other  minds  or 
‘mindreading’. Piaget and his followers placed enormous weight on the ability for perspective 
taking,  of  imagining  oneself  to  have  the  mental  states  of  another  (e.g.,  Damon  1977; 
Kohlberg,  1984;  Selman,  1980;  Rawls  1971). Over  the  last  two  decades,  there  has  been 
considerable empirical and conceptual progress in work on moral psychology and in work on 
Theory of mind (or mindreading). The moral psychology tradition has looked at the nature 
and development, as we sow above, while and the ToM tradition has explored the capacity for 
attributing mental states to others and predicting others’ behavior (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & 
Frith, 1985; Bartsch & Wellman 1995; Goldman, 1989; Gopnik & Wellman, 1994; Gordon, 
1986;  Harris,  1992; Leslie,  1994).  Although each tradition has flourished,  work on moral 
psychology  and  work  on  mindreading  has  been  pursued  largely  independently.  Some 
exception can be found in  works  in  developmental  psychology.  Nuñez and Harris  (1998) 
found  that  three-year-olds  assign  more  blame  for  intentional  behaviors,  while  Siegal  & 
Peterson  (1998)  found  that  three-year-olds  can  make  distinguish  between  the  intentional 
uttering of falsehoods, innocent mistakes and negligent mistakes. Taken together these works 
point  to  an early link between ‘theory of mind’ reasoning and moral judgment,  in which 
intentional/unintentional judgments subsequently influence good/bad judgments. 
A recent study propped by Knobe on adults (2003a), replicated with 4 and 5 years old 
children (Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006), has shown that the connection can also run in the 
opposite direction: from morality to ‘theory of mind.’ Adults were given vignettes about an 
agent who brings about a ‘foreseen side-effect’, the agent could foreseen the side effect but he 
does not care about. The scenarios were similar to these:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and 
said, ‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase 
profits,  and it  will  also help/harm the environment.’ The chairman of the 
board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about helping/harming the environment. I 
just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They 
started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was helped/harmed. 
Subjects  were  then  asked,  ‘Did  the  chairman  help/harm  the 
environment intentionally?’ 
Both in the adults and in the developmental sample participants state that the effect was 
intentional when the side effect turns out to be negative but not when it was positive. The 
authors propose that persons appear to be sensitive to the moral valence of the effect itself, 
with  morally  bad  effects  being  considered  ‘intentional’ and  morally  good  effects  being 
considered ‘unintentional’. 
But does the Knobe effect bear merely on people’s performance with the concept of 
intentional action or does it  cast  some light on people’s conceptual  competence with this 
concept?
The opinion differs: Knobe (2006) and Nichlos and Ulatowski (2007) are answering yes 
while Nadelhoffer (2006a, 2006b), Alicke (2000; 2006), Machery (forthcoming).
According to Knobe (2006), 
 
‘We are now in a position to offer a new hypothesis about the role of moral considerations in people’s 
concept of intentional action. The key claim will be that people’s intentional action intuitions tend to track 
the psychological features that are most relevant to praise and blame judgments. But - and this is where 
moral considerations come in - different psychological features will be relevant depending on whether the 
behavior itself is good or bad. That is to say, we use different psychological features when we are (a) 
trying to determine whether or not an agent deserves blame for her bad behaviors from the ones we use 
when we are (b) trying to determine whether or not an agent deserves praise for her good behaviors (p. 
225-226)’ 
Some other models addressed the issue of individual differences to better understand SEE. Nichols and 
Ulatowski (2007) authors argues that the interpretive diversity of ‘intentional’ show different style to use concept 
Anyway Nichols and Ulatowski, concur with Knobe on the fact that the concept of intentionality is shaped by its 
role in blaming and praising. 
Other  authors  are  skeptic  about  the  possibility  that  the  SEE casting  any light  on 
people’s conceptual competence with the notion of intentional action. They believe that the 
effect  results  from  factors  beyond  what  is  constitutive  of  possessing  this  concept,  a 
misunderstanding of the meaning of the test question (Adams and Steadman, 2004a; 2004b, 
Malle, 2004; McCann, 2005), negative emotions (Nadelhoffer, 2004; 2006a; 2006b) or cost-
benefit evaluation (Machery, forthcoming) The literature about the ‘side-effect’ effect , since 
now, haven’t investigate the effect in relation to the role played by the epistemic status of the 
agent. 
This  doctoral  is  aimed to  explore,  trough four groups  of experiments,  the relation 
between the moral judgment and the intentionality judgment both in adults (cap. 2.1) and 
children (cap. 2.2), the utilitarian evaluation both in adults (cap. 3.1) and children and (cap. 
3.2) and to test the possibility that continuous pattern are present in the development.
2. Investigation on the The ‘Side-Effect’ effect
2.1 The ‘Side Effect’ effect in adults
Consider the following story:
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and said, ‘We are thinking of 
starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, but it will also harm [help] the environment.’ 
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I don’t care at all about harming [helping] the environment. I just 
want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They started the new program. Sure 
enough,  the  environment  was  harmed  [helped].  Did  the  chairman  help  [harm]  the  environment 
intentionally?
How would you answer? 
If you share most adults’ intuitions (Knobe, 2003a), in the version of the story in which the new program 
had negative consequences  on the environment,  then you  are likely to judge that  the chairman harmed the 
environment intentionally (Knobe, 2003).  Now, suppose you read the version of the story in which the new 
program helps the environment (i.e., the version whose passages are indicated in brackets). In this case, if you 
share the intuitions of most individuals, you are likely to judge that the chairman did not help the environment 
intentionally (see Knobe, 2003a). This asymmetry is surprising: in both versions of the scenario, the chairman is 
described as having the same main goal (i.e., to make money), the same amount of information and the same 
lack of interest  for the possible side-effect. The only element that differs in the two versions is the valence 
(negative vs. positive) of the side-effect. When the valence is negative, most individuals concluded that the side-
effect had been produced intentionally (82% of subjects in Knobe’s study); when it is positive, few individuals 
concluded  that  the  side-effect  had  been  produced  intentionally  (23%  of  subjects  in  Knobe’s  study).  This 
phenomenon, already present in  4- and 5-years-olds (Leslie, Knobe & Cohen, 2006), has been defined ‘side 
effect effect’ (henceforth, SEE). The SEE suggests that, moral evaluation affects the everyday attribution of 
intentionality,  contrary  to  the  common  view  according  to  which  the  latter  determines  the  former.  Indeed, 
millennia  of  philosophical  reflection  and  decades  of  psychological  investigation  have  used  the  degree  of 
intentionality attributed to a given action as a crucial criterion in order to decide whether such an action is praise- 
or blameworthy (e.g., Aristotle,1998; Heider, 1958; Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994). 
However,  before drawing general  conclusions about the nature of everyday assignment of intentionality,  the 
nature and the possible sources of the SEE have to be closely scrutinized. 
In a recent article, Knobe (2006, pp. 225-226) states, ‘We are now in a position to offer a new hypothesis 
about the role of moral  considerations in people’s concept of intentional  action. The key claim will  be that 
people’s intentional action intuitions tend to track the psychological features that are most relevant to praise and 
blame judgments. But - and this is where moral considerations come in - different psychological features will be 
relevant depending on whether the behavior itself is good or bad. That is to say, we use different psychological 
features when we are (a) trying to determine whether or not an agent deserves blame for her bad behaviors from 
the ones we use when we are (b) trying to determine whether or not an agent deserves praise for her good 
behaviors.’ 
Some other authors have addressed the issue of individual differences to better understand SEE. Nichols 
and Ulatowski (2007) proposed that there are stable individual differences in the way participants interpret the 
term ‘intentionally’.  In  their  experiment  it  is  shown that  the 1/3 of  the  persons used  a flexible strategy in 
answering  the  help  and  harm  scenarios.  The  strategy  is  flexible  in  that  participants  interpret  the  word 
‘intentional’ in different way depending on the context, appealing to the motives in the help condition and to the 
foreknowledge in the negative one. On the other hand some of the participants show a coherent strategy to 
answer, in terms of foreknowledge (1/3) or motives (1/3), when asked to evaluate the intentionality both in harm 
and help scenario. Nichols and Ulatowski argue that the ‘interpretive diversity’ of the word ‘intentionally’ opens 
up a new explanation for Knobe’s results  although they concur with Knobe on the fact that  the concept of 
intentionality is shaped by its role in blaming and praising. 
Now we come to a  crucial  question:  does  the effect  cast  any light  on people’s competence with the 
concept of intentional action? Some authors (see Adams & Steadman, 2004; Machery, forthcoming; Malle, 2004; 
McCann, 2005; Nadelhoffer, 2006a, 2006b) doubt that it is the case. They believe that the asymmetric use of this 
concept in the probes within a pair, for example in the harm and help cases, results from factors beyond what is 
constitutive of  possessing this concept,  such as a incorrect  comprehension of the test  question, presence of 
negative emotions, or cost-benefit evaluation. 
Adams and Steadman (2004a; 2004b), for example, have suggested that individuals who read the negative 
side effect scenario are likely to disapprove of the chairman’s indifference to the consequences of his actions. 
Participants would like to blame the chairman’s indifference and, knowing that evaluations of blame are more 
effective at discouraging such acts if the chairman is said to have done the action intentionally, they judge the 
harming side effect as intentionally produced. In other words, participants could have meant ‘The chairman is 
responsible for the damage’ evaluating the negative side effect as produced intentionally. If Adams and Steadman 
were right it would be easy to say why participants evaluate as intentional the side effect only when it is negative 
but not when it is positiveIn the positive scenario participants do not feel the need to ascribe any guilt or express 
disapproval and therefore they do not take the questions as requiring a judgment of responsibility.  A position, 
similar to the one proposed by Adams and Steadman, has been embraced by McCann (2005) and Malle (2004). 
They believed that the behavior of the chairman, in the harm case, must be sanctioned, and for this reason is 
necessary to consider this act as product intentionally. According to these theories the misinterpretation of the 
test question seem to be the real cause of the SEE. Is this the explanation of the asymmetry? In the Experiments 
1 and 2 we will try to evaluate the hypothesis proposing the test question in a way that could not give raise to the  
‘rich interpretation’ involving attribution of responsibility.
Some authors argue that an explanation of the SEE can be found in the crucial role to the emotion aroused 
in help and harm scenarios. According to these theories, intentionality considerations are influenced by affect 
driven evaluation of the situation. Haidt (2001) underscores the role played by emotions with respect to moral 
evaluation. Nadelhoffer (2004; 2006a; 2006b) suggests that the SEE is best explained in terms of the distorting 
effects of people’s feelings of blame. Nadelhoffer, in particular, uses the term ‘biasing effect’ of emotions to 
explain this effect. He writes that ‘affective or emotional responses ... inappropriately bias our otherwise rational 
judgments’ (2006a, p. 214). 
Machery  (forthcoming)  has  proposed  the  ‘trade-off  hypothesis’ to  explain  the  SEE.  He  states,  ‘The 
hypothesis under consideration is that people make asymmetric judgments in the stories used by Knobe and 
others because they conceptualize the negative side-effect (e.g., harming the environment) as a cost that the 
agent incurs in order to reap a benefit (e.g., making profits). Because costs are intentionally incurred in order to 
reap a benefit, people judge that the foreseen, negative side-effect was intentionally brought about.’ To provide 
evidence  for  his  hypothesis,  he carried out  two experiments.  In  the  first  experiment,  he  gave subjects  two 
scenarios concerning the intentionality of the agents: in the first scenario, the agent paid an extra dollar to get 
something to drink, in the other scenario the agent obtained a free cup while buying something to drink. Subjects 
were significantly more likely to judge that the agent intentionally paid an extra dollar to get something to drink 
instead of having won the cup intentionally. In a second experiment, he gave participants two other scenarios, the 
worker case and the dog case, that were based on the trolley dilemma. Subjects were more likely to judge that 
the agent intentionally brought about the side-effect in the worker case than the side-effect in the dog case, 
because they are more likely to conceptualize the side-effect in the worker case (causing the death of the worker 
on the side tracks) than the side-effect in the dog (saving a dog in addition to five workers) as a cost incurred in 
order to reap a greater benefit. Machery takes these data to be confirmation of the ‘trade-off hypothesis.’ 
A different  explanation of the effect  comes from Alike (2000,  2007).  He develops what  he calls  the 
Culpable Control Model (CCM) of blame attribution. He argues that the primary factor for the ascription of 
blame is  personal control: ‘the freedom to effect desired behaviors and outcomes or to avoid undesired ones 
(Alike, 2000)’. The model differs from traditional rationalist ones in the emphasis it places on the claim that 
personal control judgment and blame are influenced by the relatively unconscious, spontaneous evaluation of the 
mental, behavioral and consequence elements. According to Alike, these responses and relatively unconscious 
responses can be trigged by both the evidential structural linkage information (concerning personal control) and 
other factors such as the person’s appearance, reputation and social status. According to the CCM, the SEE is 
influenced by evaluations of the callous disregard for the damage caused to the environment when persons are 
asked about the intentionality of the act. 
The experimental research seems to have demonstrated that in people’s folk concept of 
intentionality, performing an action intentionally, requires the presence of five components: a 
desire for an outcome;  beliefs  about an action that leads to that  outcome; an intention to 
perform the action; skill to perform the action; and awareness of fulfilling the intention while 
performing the action (Malle & Knobe, 1997). Is the SEE radically change this model? Malle 
(2004)  propose  that,  independently  from  the  nature  of  the  SEE,  the  naïve  concept  of 
intentionality still persist: in fact it is necessary to refer to that concept to say that persons are 
biased. In other word it is necessary to speak about the five components to say that people are 
not taking into account one of that. 
The aim of the reported studies was twofold. First, we have tried to establish whether 
the  SEE is  real  or  a  mere  epiphenomenon,  due  to  participants’ tendency to  interpret  the 
question about the intentionality of the negative SE as a question about the responsibility of 
the actor (Experiments 1, 2 and 3). Second, we have tried to establish the boundaries of the 
SEE, by investigating whether intentionality judgments are really affected by the evaluation 
of the outcome or whether they depend, more appropriately, on the evaluation of the actor’s 
intentions and beliefs (Experiments 4 and 5). 
2.1.1 Experiment 1: ‘Responsibility Implicature’ 
According to Adams and Steadman (2004), McCann (2005) and Malle (2004) when the 
SE  is  negative  individuals  seem  to  attribute  responsibility  to  the  agent.  Following  this 
hypothesis,  the  SE  would  disappear  if  the  test  question  were  explicitly  asking  for  an 
intentionality judgment, but not for a responsibility evaluation. To evaluate this hypothesis, 
we conducted an experiment using a test question that participants could not interpreted as a 
responsibility question, in fact both the options implicate this attribution. The experiment was 
designed  to  compare  the  answers  produced  by  participants  when  the  test  question  was 
standard (Knobe 2003 a) with the answers indicating that the responsibility for the SE was 
attributed to the to the chairman and the participants have to take position in relation to the 
agent’s intentionality. If Adams and others were right the participants should judge the SEE as 
unintentional, both the positive and negative stories, when the test question is not ambiguous.
Method
Participants 
The sample included 80 adults (14 male, M = 23 years, SD = 4.1 years ranging from 20 
to  42  years).  In  all  the  experiments,  participants  were  Italian  native  speakers  from  the 
Northern part of the country. They had various socioeconomic and educational backgrounds. 
Participants  took  part  voluntarily  in  the  experiments  and  received  no  pay  for  their 
participation. 
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions that result from the 
combination of two types of side effect valence (positive vs negative) and two types of test 
question (standard vs responsibility implicature). Participants had to read either the harm or 
the help version of the chairman scenario (see Knobe 2003). 
In  the  standard  question  versions,  they  had  to  answer  the  following 
question: 
Did the chairman help/harm the environment intentionally?
In  the  explicit  question  version,  they  had  to  answer  the  following 
question: 
Two judges evaluate the situation: 
Paul:  ‘The  chairman  is  responsible  for  the  damage  caused  to  the 
environment  because  he  produced  it  intentionally’  [the  chairman  is 
responsible for the help given to the environment because he produced it 
intentionally]
Daniel:  ‘The  chairman is  responsible  for  the  damage caused  to  the 
environment  but  he  did  not  produce  it  intentionally’  [the  chairman  is 
responsible for the help given to the environment but he did not produced it 
intentionally]
According to you, which one is the better judgment?
In this as well as in all the other experiments, participants were tested individually in a 
silent room, they were fully debriefed, and they indicated their answer by ticking a box at the 
end of  the  story.  The  presentation  orders  of  the  alternatives  were counterbalanced across 
participants. 
Results and discussion
In all experiments, we scored participants’ responses as Knobe (2003) did. 
Table  2.1  presents  the  percentage  of  intentionality  attribution  produced  in  the  four 
conditions of Experiment 1. As found in Knobe (2003a), in the standard question conditions, 
the negative side effect was judged intentional more often than the positive side effect, 2 (1, 
N  =  40)  =  25.6,  p <  001.  In  the  explicit  question  conditions  the  results  were  similar: 
participants accepted Paul’s judgment (the attribution of intentionality to the side effect) more 
often in the negative than in the positive condition, 2 (1, N = 40) = 28.9, p < 0.001).
The two conditions in which the SE was negative did not differ from each other, Fisher Exact Probability 
Test,  p = 1. Likewise, the two conditions in which the SE was positive did not differ from each other, Fisher 
Exact Probability Test, p = .99.
Table 2. 1: Percentage of Intentionality Attributions in Experiment 1 
through 5
Side Effect
Condition Positive Negative
Experiment 1
Standard 10 90
Explicit question 10 95
Experiment 2
No implicature scenario15 85
Experiment 3
Caring attitude - 69
Experiment 4
External Ignorance 10 70
Internal Ignorance 20 54
Experiment 5
False Belief - 22
The results do not support the Adams and others’ hypothesis. Participants continued to 
attribute  intentionality  to  the  chairman  even  when  the  factors  of  intentionality  and 
responsibility were separated. We conduct a second experiment in order to verify if giving 
relevance to the responsibility of the chairman, making explicit mention about the fact that the 
agent  has  to  pay a 5.000 euros sanction independently from the intentionality attribution, 
could make any changes in the participants evaluation.  If Adams and other were right the 
participants should judge the SEE as unintentional,  both the positive and negative stories, 
when the test question is not ambiguous.
2.1.2 Experiment 2: ‘Responsibility Implicature’
Method
Participant
The sample included 59 adults participated in the experiment (20 males, M = 26 years, 
SD = 3.4 years, ranging from 19 to 35).
Procedure 
Participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of  the  two  conditions:  responsibility 
implicature with a positive side effect (n = 20), responsibility implicature with a negative side 
effect (n = 39). The procedure was the same as in the Experiment 1 except for the alternative 
proposed as answers to the test question.
Two judges evaluate the situation: 
Paul: The chairman must pay a fine of 5.000 euro [The chairman will 
receive a reward of 5.000 euros]: he is responsible for the damage caused to 
the environment because he produced it intentionally [he is responsible for 
the help given to the environment because he produced it intentionally]
Daniel: The chairman must pay a sanction of 5.000 euro [The chairman 
will  receive  5.000  euro]:  he  is  responsible  of  the  damage  caused  to  the 
environment but he did not produce it intentionally [he is responsible for the 
help given to the environment but he did not produced it intentionally]
According to you, which one is the better judgment?
Result and discussion 
On the responsibility implicature test question, few persons judged the side effect as 
intentionally produced when the valence was positive (Daniel’s judgment) while the majority 
judged  the  side  effect  as  intentionally  produced  when  the  valence  was  negative  (Paul’s 
judgment). The difference was statistically significant, 2 (1, N = 59) = 26.9, p < 0.001. 
Taken together the results of Experiment 1 and 2 show that the participants do not seem 
to  mistakenly  interpret  question  about  the  attribution  of  intentionality  with  question  on 
attribution of responsibility (Adams & Steadman, 2004a; 2004b),
Alike (2007) sustains that participants, influenced by the callous disregard 
for the damage,  assign intentionality  to the negative SE (2007).  In other 
words, participants would assign intentionality to the negative side effect 
not  because  of  the  negative  evaluation  itself  but  rather  because  of  the 
attitude of the agent toward the side effect. If Alike’s hypothesis is correct in 
Experiment 3 the negative SE should not be judged as intentional.
2.1.3 Experiment 3: ‘Caring attitude’
Method
Participants
The adult sample included 30 participants, of which (5 males, M = 23.5, SD = 3.1 years, 
ranging from 20 to 31 years).
Procedure
Participants were given only the harm version of Knobe’s stories. The sentence ‘I don’t 
care at all about helping/harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can’ 
was substituted with ‘I am sorry if the environment will be harmed, but we must increase 
profits: Let’s start the new program.’ In this experiment we use the standard test question 
proposed by Knobe (2003, see also Experiment 1).
Results and discussion
The majority of the participants stated that the damage was produced intentionally. 
The  careless  attitude  of  the  chairman  did  not  change  the  intentionality  attribution  of  the 
participants. According to Malle and Knobe (1997) one of the five elements that is necessary 
to determine intentionality evaluation is the belief about an action that leads to that outcome. 
We evaluated the possibility that the agent’s epistemic status could have a crucial influence in 
determining the SEE. The models that underline the role of emotions in determining the SEE 
(Haidt, 2001; Nadelhoffer, 2004; 2006a; 2006b) should not be influenced by the manipulation 
on agent’s epistemic status (belief) because the negative effect still persists. If the emotion 
based models were right the changes on the epistemic status of the agent should not modify 
the intentionality evaluation, on the other hand if Malle and Knobe (1997) were right, when 
the agent  could not  foreknow the consequence of SE the intentionality evaluation should 
decrease.
2.1.4 Experiment 4: ‘Internal and External Ignorance’
In the following experiment, we manipulated the belief of the agent (level of ignorance) 
about  the  side  effect  using  scenarios  characterized  by  different  level  of  chairman’s 
foreknowledge of the SE. In the internal ignorance scenario, the agent could not foreknown 
the result of the action, because he was not informed about that. By contrast, in the External 
ignorance scenario nobody could foreknow the side effects of the agent’s action (Kahneman, 
& Tversky, 1982) because it was generally unknown.
Method
Participants
The sample included 99 adults (25 male, M = 21,9 year, SD 2.3 ranging from 18 to 36) 
Procedure
In Experiment 4, participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions: two 
valence types (positive vs negative) and two types of ignorance (internal vs external). The 
scenarios given to the participants were the following:
Internal Ignorance Scenario
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and 
said ‘We are thinking of starting a  new program. It  will  help us increase 
profits’.  The vice president knows that the program would have harm the 
environment but he didn’t told to the chairman.
The chairman of the board answered, ‘I want to make as much profit as 
I can. Let’s start the new program.’ They started the new program. And the 
environment was harmed/helped. 
Did the chairman help/harm the environment intentionally?
External Ignorance Scenario 
The vice-president of a company went to the chairman of the board and 
said,  ‘We are  thinking  of  starting  a  new program.  It  will  help  us  increase 
profits but we do not know what it could be its impact on the environment.’
The chairman of the board answered: ‘I want to make as much profit as I 
can.  Let’s  start  the new program’.  They started the new program. And the 
environment was harmed/helped. 
Did the chairman help/harm the environment intentionally?
Results
 In the Internal ignorance condition, few persons evaluated the help produced the 
effect as intentionally when the valence was positive, while nearly half of the participants 
evaluated  the  damage  as  produced  intentionally  when  the  valence  was  negative.  The 
differences were not significant, 2 (1, N = 48) = 3.38, p = 0.06. In the External ignorance 
condition, few participants evaluated the help as intentionally produced when the valence 
was positive, while the majority of the participants evaluated the effect as intentionally 
determined when the valence was negative. The difference was statistically significant, 2  
(1, N = 55) = 21.86, p < 0.001. The two conditions in which the SE was negative did not 
differ from each other, 2 (1, N = 48) = 3.9, p = 0.08.
We explain the fact that half of the subjects continued to judge the harm produced as 
intentional in terms of ‘semifactual’ reasoning. Participants could have thought ‘the chairman 
stated that his first interest is to do as much profit as he can. Hence, even if he could have 
known the harmful effect of his action, he could not have changed it.’ Observing that the 
pattern of answer, it is not possible to exclude the influence of emotions in determining the 
effect. For this reason we gave participants (Experiment 5) scenarios in which chairman had a 
false belief about the consequences of the side effect. In this new experiment the absence of 
belief is more explicit, and the semifactual reasoning is blocked. If Malle and Knobe (1997) 
were right,  when the agent has a false belief on the consequence of SE the intentionality 
evaluation should decrease.
2.1.5 Experiment 5: ‘False beliefs’
Method
Participants
The sample included 62 adults (35 male, M = 21, SD = 4.6, ranging from 18 to 45).
Procedure
Participants  were  randomly  assigned  to  one  of  the  two  false  belief 
conditions: in one condition the participants were asked to answer a question on 
the  chairman’s  belief  first  and  then  a  question  about  the  intentionality;  in  the 
second condition, participants were asked to answer a question about intentionality 
first  and  then  one  about  chairman’s  belief.  The  scenarios  were  given  to  the 
participants were the following:
The vice-president of a company went to the board chairman and said: 
‘We are thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits and 
it will also help the environment.’ The vice president knew that the program 
would have damage the environment but he told a lay to avoid the rejection of 
the program. In the past the chairman was fined for damage produced to the 
environment  and  he  does  not  want  the  accident  to  be  repeat  again.  The 
chairman  of  the  board  answered,  ‘I  don’t  care  at  all  about  harming  the 
environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the new 
program.’ They started the new program. Sure enough, the environment was 
helped.  The  program  was  enact  and  it  provoke  a  big  damage  for  the 
environment  think  that  astonish  the  chairman  because  he  belief  that  the 
program would have helped the environment.
Subjects were then asked
- The chairman knows that the program would have...
Helped the environment
Damaged the environment
- ‘Did the chairman harm the environment intentionally?’
Results
The results show that, in the belief-first condition, 29 participants judged the chairman’s 
belief as helping while 9 participants judged the chairman’s belief as harmful. Evaluating only 
the participants who attributed the helping belief to the chairman (n = 20), we found that 4 
only persons evaluated the side effect as product intentionally.
In  the  intentionality-first  condition,  9  participants  attributed  intentionality  to  the 
chairman  and  2  attributed  the  belief  of  harming  to  the  chairman.  Evaluating  only  the 
participants that attributed a help belief to the chairman (n = 22), only 7 participants judged 
the side-effect as intentional. Responses in the conditions did not differ significantly, Fisher 
Exact Probability Test, p = 0.17, so the two group were collapsed.
General discussion
The aim of this investigation was to examine the relation between pragmatic evaluation, 
caring  attitude,  epistemic  status  and  intentionality  judgments  in  relation  to  the  SEE. 
Experiments 1 and 2 evaluated the explanation of the SEE proposed by Adams and Steadman 
(2004a;  2004b),  McCann  (2005)  and  Malle  (2004).  In  both  experiments,  we  tried  to 
disambiguate the test question by blocking ambiguous interpretation of the test question. The 
participants continued to  attribute intentionality to  the chairman when the side effect  was 
negative but not when it was positive. Our results show that pragmatic factors play a minor 
role, if any, in the SEE.
In  the  Experiment  3,  we  examined  the  chairman’s  attitude  as  a  factor  that  could 
determine the intentionality attribution (Alike,  2006),  we realized that the majority of the 
participants continue to  attribute  intentionality to the chairman. This result  shows that,  in 
terms of the elements that could produce the SEE, the attitude is not really meaningful. In the 
last two experiments (Experiments 4 and 5) we evaluated the role played by epistemic mental 
state  in  producing  the  intentionality  attribution.  The  data  showed  that  people  decreased 
intentionality judgments when the chairman was described as not having foreknowledge or 
having  the  false  belief  about  the  consequences  of  his  action.  Data  from  Experiment  5 
highlight that the source of knowledge that inform people about the intentionality of an action 
is the chairman’s mental states. 
The crucial question opened in the introduction refers to the possibility that the SEE is 
casting any light on people’s competence with the concept of intentional action. Knobe (2006) 
and  Nichols  and  Ulatowski  (2007)  claim  that  responses  to  measures  of  the  SEE  reflect 
participants’ grasp of the concept of intentionality. By contrast, other authors propose sustain 
that  the effect  results  from factors beyond what is  constitutive of possessing this  concept 
(Adams & Steadman; 2004a; 2004b; Machery, forthcoming; Nadelhoffer, 2006). Our results 
suggest that intentionality evaluation of the SE, in the harm case, are influenced by epistemic 
status (Experiment 5) and less negative effect of the action (Experiment 4) but not the agent’s 
declarations of uncaring (Experiment 3). In our opinion, the fact that the SEE disappear when 
it is explicitly underlined the chairman does not have the belief to produce a negative side 
effect,  seem to corroborate Malle’s proposal. In other words, the SEE is not changing the 
model on the naïve concept of intentionality proposed by Malle and Knobe (1997)
In the  next  chapter,  we evaluate  the  possibility that  the  intentionality judgments  of 
preschoolers and adults are influenced in the same way.

2.2 Foreknowledge, Caring, and the ‘Side-Effect’ effect in young children
In the context of the recent burgeoning interest in moral psychology (Dwyer, 2006; 
Hauser, 2006), a major focus for research has concerned the side-effect effect (SEE). This 
effect occurs in adults asked to consider scenarios in which agents dismiss information about 
the harming or helping side effects of their actions. Harmful side effects of these actions are 
judged as having been produced intentionally whereas the helpful side effects are not. The 
asymmetry  is  surprising  because,  in  both  the  negative  and  positive  scenarios,  agents  are 
explicitly described as dismissive (‘not caring’) about the side effects of their actions. In an 
intriguing series of studies, Knobe (2003a, 2003b, 2004) gave adults stories in which the issue 
of not caring was stated in relation to positive or negative side effects. For example, in one 
situation, a company vice-president was described as having told the board chairman, ‘We are 
thinking of starting a new program. It will help us increase profits, and it will also help/harm 
the  environment.’  The  chairman  of  the  board  answered,  ‘I  don’t  care  at  all  about 
helping/harming the environment. I just want to make as much profit as I can. Let’s start the 
new  program.’  They  started  the  new  program.  Sure  enough,  the  environment  was 
helped/harmed.  The  test  question  was  ‘Did  the  chairman  help/harm  the  environment 
intentionally?’ Judgments  of  whether  or  not  the  chairman  brought  about  the  side  effect 
intentionally depended crucially upon whether or not this was helping or harmful. Participants 
often – but not always – judged the helpful side effect  as unintentional. If the effect  was 
harmful, it was often judged as intentional. In this case, there had been a clear reference to 
declarations  of  uncaring  that  the environment  could be  harmed by the company’s  action. 
Leslie, Knobe and Cohen (2006) reported a similar asymmetry in 4- and 5-years-olds. In one 
condition in which the outcome was negative, children were told, ‘Here is a boy named Andy, 
and he's over at his house. And here is a girl named Janine, and she's over at her house. And 
look what Andy has with him, he has a ... [frog]. Now Andy loves frogs, but Janine hates 
frogs. Now can you remember, does Andy love frogs? Does Janine love frogs? Andy wants to 
bring the frog over to Janine's house, but she will get upset. Why will she get upset? Now 
listen very carefully. Andy does not care that Janine will get upset. He is going to bring the 
frog over anyway. Does Andy care that Janine will get upset? So Andy brings the frog over to 
Janine's house and she gets upset. Now I have a question for you. Does Andy make Janine 
upset  on purpose?’ In another  condition,  the story structure was the same except that  the 
second character likes the frog and there was a happy outcome. The children answered that 
the side effect was brought about ‘on purpose’ when it was negative but not when positive, 
suggesting a link that runs from moral outcomes to theory of mind (judgments of purpose). 
This finding complements research that has pointed to a link that runs from theory of mind to 
negative  judgments  of  morally  reprehensible  outcomes  based  on  an  agent’s  state  of 
knowledge (Nuñez & Harris, 1998; Piaget, 1932) that includes judgments of negligence in 
both preschoolers (Siegal & Peterson, 1998) and adults (Walster, 1966). Leslie et al.’s (2006) 
studies  represent  an  initial  examination  indicating continuity between young children  and 
adults in showing a SEE. The aim of our investigation was to clarify the circumstances under 
which children demonstrate this effect. In Leslie et al.’s work, statements about not caring on 
the part of the agent could have been interpreted to imply that the agent did have knowledge 
of the outcome but chose to dismiss this possibility. In fact, as Nichols and Ulatowski (2007, 
p.  360)  have  observed,  the  key  issue  for  intentionality  judgments  may  concern 
foreknowledge. If so, participants could interpret declarations of not caring as evidence of a 
deliberate intention based on possessing the foreknowledge that harm could occur.  Adults 
may regard statements such as ‘The chairman harmed the environment intentionally’ and ‘The 
chairman  knowingly  incurred  the  risk  of  harming  the  environment’ to  merit  equivalent 
intentionality judgments (Adams & Steadman, 2004a; 2004b). In this respect it  is unclear 
whether Leslie et al.’s SEE findings concern a side effect that is foreknown but disavowed – 
one  that  is  similar  to  a  negligent  mistake  with  a  negative  outcome  that  was  identifiable 
beforehand – and a side effect similar to a pure or honest mistake in which the consequences 
are genuinely brought about without foreknowledge. To clarify the issue of foreknowledge 
and declarations of not caring in creating the SEE and asymmetry in intentionality judgments, 
we carried out three experiments involving preschoolers from urban, middle-class areas of 
northeastern  Italy.  They  participated  with  informed  parental  consent  and  no  child  was 
included  in  more  than  one  experiment.  In  Experiment  6,  we  manipulated  the  state  of 
knowledge  (possessing  or  lacking  foreknowledge)  of  an  uncaring  agent  whose  behavior 
resulted in either a positive or negative outcome. We predicted that ‘on purpose’ intentionality 
judgments would be restricted to situations in which the action of an uncaring agent created a 
negative side effect rather than a positive one.  
Experiment 6: ‘Lack of caring’
Method
Participants 
These were 89 children divided in two age groups: 4-year-old (n = 34, 14 female; M = 
4 years, 6 months, SD = 3.16 months; range = 48 to 59 months) and 5-year-old (n = 55, 25 
female; M = 5 years, 5 months, SD = 3.52 months; range = 60 to 71 months). Each child was 
tested in a quiet schoolroom during two 15-minute sessions separated by a month interval. 
Five other 4-year-olds were excluded: one because of specific language disability and four 
who failed control questions. 
Procedure 
Training phase. To ensure that the children understood thought bubbles that were to be 
used in the test stories, each child was told a story about twin brothers who were about to 
celebrate their fifth birthday illustrated using a sequence of three pictures: a boy with a dog 
inside a thought bubble to represent ‘thinking about a dog,’ a boy with a dog on a leash 
represent actually having a dog, and a girl drawn with an empty thought bubble to represent 
not knowing the information about the agent’s state of mind. The story was retold to children 
who answered incorrectly on comprehension control questions. No child in the experiment 
failed the questions twice, consistent with previous studies on preschoolers’ understanding of 
thought bubbles (Kerr & Durkin, 2004; Wellman, Hollander, & Schult, 1996). 
Test Phase. Each child was told eight stories, two of which were each used to represent 
four  possible  combinations:  knowing  agent-positive  outcome,  unknowing  agent-positive 
outcome,  knowing  agent-negative  outcome,  and  unknowing  agent-negative  outcome  (see 
Appendix). Half of the children were told four stories with the positive outcome first (two 
with agent foreknowledge and two without agent foreknowledge). Then in a second testing 
session about  a  month later,  they received four negative outcome stories (again two with 
foreknowledge and two without). The remaining children received the four negative outcome 
stories  in  the  first  testing  session  and the  positive  ones  in  the  second one.  The  order  of 
presentation  in  the  stories  of  agents  possessing  or  lacking  foreknowledge  was 
counterbalanced across children.  In all  eight cases,  the agent  was described as not caring 
about the outcome as in Leslie et al.’s (2006) investigation. Illustrations were used to aid in 
storytelling with children asked control questions to monitor attention and understanding of 
the basic plot. The stories had two female and two male characters and two different types of 
animal (a frog and a gerbil) that one character, the agent, was described as having presented to 
a second character. Answers to each of the test questions were given a score of 1 if the child 
judged the side effect as intentional and a score of 0 if judged as unintentional. Thus for each 
of the two stories that represented the four combinations of foreknowledge and outcome, a 
child received a score on a 0-2 scale.  
Results and discussion
Preliminary  analyses  indicated  that  there  were  no  main  or  interaction  effects 
attributable to the story theme, order of the story presentation, order of story valence, or order 
of test questions. Therefore responses were analyzed in a 2 (age group: 4- vs. 5-years-old) X 2 
(valence outcome: positive vs. negative) X 2 (foreknowledge: present vs. absent) ANOVA, 
with  age  group as  a  between-subjects  factor  and  valence  outcome and foreknowledge as 
within-subjects  factors.  As  shown  in  Figure  2.1,  a  SEE  pattern  emerged.  There  were 
significant  main  effects  for  valence  outcome,  F(1,  87)= 53.51,  p <  0.001,  2 =  .38,  and 
foreknowledge,  F(1, 87) = 22,31,  p < 0.001,  2 = 20. More ‘on purpose’ judgments were 
given  for  negative  than  for  positive  side  effects  and for  agents  possessing  rather  lacking 
foreknowledge. The valence outcome X foreknowledge interaction effect was also significant, 
F(1, 87) = 10.76, p < 0.01, 2 = .38, and foreknowledge, F(1, 87) = 22,31, p < 0.001, 2 = . 
20. More ‘on purpose’ judgments were given for negative than for positive side effects and for 
agents  possessing  rather  lacking  foreknowledge.  The  valence  outcome  X  foreknowledge 
interaction effect was also significant, F(1, 87) = 10.76, p < 0.01, 2 = .11. When the outcome 
was negative, more on purpose judgments were assigned to the agent with foreknowledge (M 
= 1.39,  SD = .77) than without foreknowledge (M = .94,  SD = .78),  F(1, 87) = 23.08,  p < 
0.001, 2 = .21. By contrast, when the outcome was positive, the difference was insignificant 
(M =  0.49,  SD =  .72  and  M =  0.39,  SD =  .68  respectively).  There  was  considerable 
consistency in responses across conditions. The correlations between intentionality judgments 
of the agents with and without foreknowledge were significant (for positive outcome stories, r 
= .73, p < .01; for negative outcome stories, r = .46, p < .01). Altogether, 34 of 89 children 
unambiguously displayed an asymmetrical  pattern  in  their  intentionality judgments  of  the 
stories involving foreknowledge by judging the agents as having acted intentionally when 
causing  harm  on  both  ‘knowing  agent-negative  outcome’ stories  but  not  having  acted 
intentionally on both ‘knowing agent-positive outcome’ stories. Though about half (47.7%) of 
the judgments of agents without foreknowledge whose actions resulted in a negative outcome 
were  intentional,  there  were  indications  that  the  children  were not  responding by chance 
alone. In the negative scenarios, 19 of the 25 children who judged in both stories that the 
agent without foreknowledge acted on purpose also judged that the agent with foreknowledge 
in both stories also acted on purpose.   
Figure 2.1. Children’s intentionality judgments in positive and negative scenarios of Experiment 6 for 
uncaring agents whose foreknowledge of the outcome was present or absent 
As Leslie et al. (2006) found for the SEE, preschoolers often judge agents’ actions as 
intentional when there is a disavowed (uncaring) negative outcome but not when there is a 
positive outcome. However, the presence of substantial individual differences supports the 
notion of ‘interpretative diversity’ of intentionality proposed by Nichols and Ulatowski (2007) 
that involves both foreknowledge and motive. On the one hand, children’s judgments often 
focused on the presence or absence of foreknowledge in an uncaring agent (‘Andy does not 
care that Janine will get upset’). Children were more likely to judge as intentional a negative 
effect  produced by an agent  with foreknowledge than one  produced by an agent  without 
foreknowledge. On the other hand, although intentionality judgments decreased significantly 
when  the  agent  was  described  as  not  knowing  about  the  effect,  a  substantial  number  of 
children  displayed  the  SEE  even  in  the  absence  of  foreknowledge.  They  displayed  a 
judgmental  pattern  that  appeared  to  be  mainly  based  on  agent  motive  in  relation  to 
declarations of uncaring. In Experiment 7, we sought to test the strength of the asymmetrical 
pattern shown in Experiment 6 by determining whether omitting information about the agent’s 
state  of  caring  would  influence  children’s  intentionality  judgments.  We  predicted  that 
judgments would be influenced by knowledge only when the outcome was foreknown and 
negative.    
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Experiment 7: ‘Lack of knowledge’
Method
Participants  
These were 46 children divided in two age groups: 4-years-old (n = 24, 11 female; M 
= 4 years and 5 months,  SD = 4.20; range = 48 to 59 months) and 5-years-old (n = 22, 18 
female; M = 5 years and 4 months, SD = 3.5 months; range = 60 to 71 months). Each child 
was tested in two 15-minute sessions separated by a month interval. One other 4-year-old who 
failed control questions was excluded.  
Procedure 
This  was  the  same  as  in  Experiment  6  except  that  no  mention  was  made  of  the 
disinterest of the actor (‘not caring’) in the outcome. 
Results
Preliminary  analyses  indicated  that  there  were  no  main  or  interaction  effects 
attributable to the story theme, order of the story presentation, order of story valence, or order 
of test questions. Therefore the results were analyzed in a 2 (age group: 4- vs. 5-years-old) X 
2 (valence outcome: positive vs. negative) X 2 (foreknowledge: present vs. absent) ANOVA 
with  age  group as  a  between-subjects  factor  and  valence  outcome and  foreknowledge as 
within-subject factors. There were significant main effects for valence outcome,  F(1, 44) = 
27.46, p < 0.001, 2 =.38, and foreknowledge, F(1, 44) = 96.11, p < 0.001, 2 = 69, together 
with a significant valence outcome X foreknowledge interaction effect, F(1, 44) = 64.47, p < 
0.01, 2 = .59. As predicted, intentionality judgments were influenced by foreknowledge only 
when the outcome was negative. As shown in Figure 2.2 with regard to negative outcomes, 
children were significantly more likely to assign on purpose judgments when foreknowledge 
was present (M = 1.54,  SD = .75) than absent (M = .17, SD = .48), F(1, 44) = .81,  p < .81, 
=.001. When the reaction was positive, the difference was insignificant (M = 0.30, SD = 0.69 
and M = .28,  SD = .58 respectively),  F(1, 44) = 111.83,  p < 0.001, 2 = .71. In the case of 
negative  outcomes,  we compared  children’s  responses  in  Experiments  6  and 7.  A 2 (age 
group) X 2 (caring state: uncaring vs. unspecified) X 2 (foreknowledge: present vs. absent) 
ANOVA with age group and caring state as between-subjects factors and knowledge state as a 
within-subjects factor revealed a significant main effects for caring state, F(1, 131) = 8.55, p 
< 0.01,  2 =.06, and foreknowledge,  F(1, 131) = 136.36,  p < 0.001, as well as a significant 
caring state X foreknowledge interaction effect, F(1, 131) = 36.07, p < 0.001, 2 =.22. When 
there  was  foreknowledge  of  the  potential  harm was  absent,  intentionality  was  attributed 
significantly  more  often  to  the  uncaring  agent  than  to  the  agent  for  whom  caring  was 
unspecified,  F(1, 134) = 36.59,  p < 0.001. When foreknowledge was present, the difference 
between the agents was insignificant,  F(1, 134) = 1.15,  p >.28. There were no significant 
main or interaction effects involving age group. 
Figure 2.2. Children’s intentionality judgments in positive and negative scenarios of Experiment 7 for 
agents with unspecified caring whose foreknowledge of the outcome was present or absent.
Experiment 8: ‘False belief’
In  both  Experiments  6  and  7,  there  was  substantial  asymmetry  in  intentionality 
judgments  with  children  often  responding  that  negative  effects  were  brought  about  on 
purpose. Only in the case of an agent described as without foreknowledge and whose state of 
caring was unspecified did children generally respond that the effect was not brought about on 
purpose.  Therefore,  the aim of Experiment 8 was to examine the effects on intentionality 
attributions of an agent explicitly described as having a false belief about the outcome of his 
or her actions. In contrast to Experiment 7 in which the negative outcome of a knowledgeable 
agent’s actions was judged as purposeful, we predicted that, in the case of a agent with a false 
belief, children would be unlikely to attribute intentionality regardless of outcome and that, 
even if the outcome was negative, children would be likely to exonerate the agent.
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Method
Participants
These were 52 children divided into two age groups: 4-year-old (n = 26, 15 female; M = 
4 years, 6 months,  SD = 2.7 months; range = 51 to 59 months) and 5-year-old (n = 26, 11 
female; M = 5 years, 5 months, SD = 4.4 months; range = 60 to 71 months). Each child was 
tested  in  an  experimental  session  lasting  about  15  minutes.  No  children  were  excluded 
because of failure on control questions.  
Procedure 
This was similar to Experiments 6 and 7 except that children received four stories 
instead of eight (two with a positive outcome and two with a negative outcome). In these 
stories, we described the agent as having a false belief about the other character’s reaction that 
was in reality negative in the case of an agent who had believed that it would be positive and 
was in reality positive in the case of an agent who had believed that it would be negative. As 
in Experiment 7, there was no mention of the uncaring state of the agent. To simplify the story 
presentation, no indication was given about the actual outcome in terms of the reaction of the 
second story character. 
Results
There were few ‘on purpose’ responses to the agents with false beliefs: 19.2% in the 
positive  outcome  condition  and  11.5%  in  the  negative  outcome  condition.  Preliminary 
analyses  indicated  that  there  were  no  main  or  interaction  effects  attributable  to  the  story 
theme, order of the story presentation, order of story valence or order of test questions. The 
results were analyzed in a 2 (age group: 4- vs. 5-years-old) X 2 (valence outcome: positive vs. 
negative) repeated measures ANOVA. There was a main effect of age,  F(1, 50) = 5.65,  p < 
0.05, 2 = .10, but no main or interaction effect involving outcome, F’s < 1.7. In keeping with 
findings  that  preschoolers’  success  on  standard  false  belief  tasks  increases  with  age 
(Callaghan et al., 2005; Siegal, 2008), 5-year-olds were significantly more likely than 4-year-
olds to absolve the story character with a false belief of intentionality regardless of whether 
the outcome was positive or negative (5 years: M = .28, SD = .58; 4 years: M = .66, SD = .83, 
respectively). There was a significant correlation between the children answer to the false 
belief stories with a positive and negative outcome (r = .36, p < 0.05). To compare the results 
of  Experiment  8  with  those  of  the  foreknowledge  present  (true  belief)  condition  of 
Experiment  7,  we  carried  out  a  2  (age  group)  X 2  (belief:  true  vs.  false)  X 2  (valence 
outcome: positive vs. negative) ANOVA with age group and belief as between subjects factors 
and  valence  outcome as  a  within-subjects  factor.  There  was a  significant  main  effect  for 
outcome, F(1, 97) = 64.32, p < 0.001, 2 = .39 and a significant outcome X belief interaction 
effect, F(1, 97) = 16.45, p < 0.001, 2 = .14. As shown in Figure 2.3, when the outcome was 
negative, children were significantly more likely to judge as intentional the action of an agent 
with a true belief (M = 1.55, SD = .74) than the action of an agent with a false belief (M = .38, 
SD = .69), F(1, 98) = 65.49, p >.001, 2 =.40. When the outcome was positive, the difference 
between the agent with a true belief (M = .30, SD = .68) and the agent with a false belief (M = 
.54, SD = .80) was insignificant, F(1, 98) = 2.97, p >.08, 2 = .03. 
Figure 2.3. Children’s intentionality judgments in positive and negative scenarios of Experiment 8 for 
agents with unspecified caring whose foreknowledge of the outcome was true or false
General Discussion
The aim of this investigation was to examine the influence of agent foreknowledge 
and uncaring declarations in children’s asymmetrical intentionality judgments of actions with 
positive and negative outcomes. Experiment 6 compared ‘on purpose’ judgments of agents 
who either  possessed  foreknowledge  of  the  effects  of  their  actions  or  did  not,  following 
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declarations of not caring. When a careless agent knowingly produced a negative side effect, 
young children – as do adults (Knobe, 2004) – often judge this effect as intentional, consistent 
with the proposal of continuity in the SEE. A lack of foreknowledge produced a significant 
decline, but many children still persisted in responding that the negative effects were brought 
about intentionality. The pattern was asymmetrical in that, for the positive stories, the agent’s 
action was mostly judged as unintentional whether foreknowledge was absent or present. In 
Experiment 7, unspecified caring on the part of the story perpetrator was contrasted with the 
SEE shown in Experiment  6.  Only when a  negative  outcome was foreknown were  there 
strong judgments of intentionality that contrasted with a corresponding lack of intentionality 
attributions for the effects caused by an agent who lacked foreknowledge. This finding was 
replicated in Experiment 8 in which children infrequently judged an agent with a false belief 
who produced a negative outcome as having acted purposely.
Our investigation with 4- and 5-year-olds was limited in that no detailed rationale was 
provided for the uncaring declarations of the agent and the judged effects were restricted to a 
single instance of a child’s happiness or upset reaction. Bearing these issues in mind, our 
results suggest that many preschoolers as well as adults are capable of a rational analysis of 
situations involving helping or harming by using information about a protagonist’s mental 
state, both in terms of caring and foreknowledge. An area in need of further study concerns 
the  nature  of  continuity  in  intentionality  judgment  asymmetry  and  the  extent  to  which 
considerations of caring and foreknowledge remains stable with age. In terms of the debate 
over the primacy of cognitive and emotional factors in moral judgment (Danovitch & Keil, 
2008; Greene & Haidt, 2002; Haidt, 2001; Nichols & Mallon, 2006; Pizarro & Bloom, 2003), 
another important issue concerns how asymmetry relates to variations in moral orientations 
across  cultures  (Shweder,  Much,  Mahapatra,  &  Park,  1997),  and  the  extent  to  which 
asymmetrical patterns can mediated by the strength of reactions involving emotions such as 
fear and disgust.
3. Utilitarian moral reasoning
For decades,  moral  cognition  has  been described  as  a  developmental  process  that 
takes the form of an invariant sequence of stages (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932). Yet while 
classic  models  posit  stage-like  discontinuities,  more  recent  accounts  have  proposed  that 
certain significant aspects of moral understanding are present in young children, at least from 
the  age  of  4  years  (Nuñez & Harris,  1998;  Siegal  & Peterson,  1998;  Turiel,  2006).  For 
example,  studies  of  the ‘side-effect  effect’ in  which  a  foreseen  action  produced  by  an 
uncaring protagonist results in a negative or positive outcome indicate that both children and 
adults  are  significantly more likely to  judge the negative  effect  than the  positive  one  as 
having been brought about intentionally (Knobe, 2005; Leslie, Knobe, & Cohen, 2006). 
However, to date, young children’s moral understanding has not been investigated in 
connection with the burgeoning research on adults that concerns the factors, or principles, 
that affect the production of utilitarian moral judgments. These studies have typically asked 
adults  to  solve  dilemmas  such  as  the  ‘trolley’ or  ‘footbridge’ dilemmas  that  involve 
sacrificing  one  person  in  order  to  save  five  others  (Foot,  1978;  Thomson,  1986).  By 
systematically  varying  some  aspects  of  these  dilemmas,  Cushman,  Young,  &  Hauser 
(2006) have found that adults rate harm caused by an action as less permissible than harm 
caused by an omission (the action principle), harm caused as a mean to an end as worse 
than harm caused as a foreseen side effect (the intention principle) and harm produced by 
physical contact worse than harm caused without involving physical contact (the contact 
principle;  Greene,  Nystrom,  Engell,  Darley,  &  Cohen,  2004;  Greene,  Sommerville, 
Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Hauser, 2006; Hauser, Cushman, Young, Jin, & Mikhail, 
2007; Hauser, Young, & Cushman, 2007; Nichols & Mallon, 2006). Contrary to what one 
would expect if persons strictly follow an utilitarian calculus, adults’ adherence to these 
principles is found also when the cost-benefit ratio of the relevant decisions and actions is 
kept constant. 
Departing  from traditional  models  that  emphasize  the  conscious  nature  of  moral 
reasoning (Kohlberg, 1969; Piaget, 1932), Cushman et al. (2006) propose that only some 
of the processes that guide moral judgments are conscious. In this respect, Greene et al. 
(2001, 2004) have underscored the importance of alternative ‘emotional’ factors, such as 
the  degree  of  the  agent’s  personal  involvement.  They  have  reported  that  utilitarian 
evaluations are less frequent in personal than in impersonal scenarios. These proposals are 
in keeping with the tradition that emphasizes the role of emotional processes in moral 
evaluation (Haidt, 2001; Hume, 1777/1960). 
So far these aspects of moral cognition have been investigated mainly in adults coming 
from English speaking countries. The Experiments 9 and 10 were aimed to observe the way 
Italian adults answers to the Trolley and the Footbridge dilemma, both in a versions for adults 
and in one suitable for children. The Experiments 11, 12 and 13 were designed to determine 
whether young children, like adults, are sensitive to utilitarian cost/benefit ratios and whether 
they  rely  on  the  contact  or  intention  principles  when  judging  the  permissibility  of 
interventions. 
3.1 Utilitarian moral reasoning in adults
3.1.1 Experiment 9: ‘Utilitarian judgment in adults’ 
The Experiment 9 was designed to verify if the asymmetric pattern of answers, shown 
by English speaking participants, was present also in an Italian sample. In Experiment 9 we 
differentiate between the dilemma proposed by Greene et al. (2004) and by Cushman et al. 
(2006) because they proposed different way to address the test question: if in Greene et al.’s 
study the question was more neutral, they asked about the appropriateness of the action (Is it 
appropriate for you to push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen?), 
the Cushman et al.’s (2006) proposal was oriented on the moral permissibility of the action (Is 
it morally permissible for Frank to shove the man?). 
Method
Participants. 
The adult  sample included 82 participants  (51 female,  M = 29.34,  SD = 6.8  years, 
ranging from 18 to 58 years). Participants were all Italian native speakers from the Northern 
part  of  the  country,  they  have  various  socioeconomic  and  educational  backgrounds.  All 
subjects were tested individually in a silent room.
Procedure
 The participants were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions that result from 
the combination of two types of test question (Greene version vs Cushman version) and two 
types of dilemma (Trolley vs Footbridge). Fifteen participants were asked to read an Italian 
version of the ‘Trolley dilemma’ proposed by Greene et al. (2001), while fifteen participants 
were asked to read an Italian translation of the ‘Footbridge dilemma’ Greene et al. (2001). 
Twenty-six  participants  were  asked  to  read  an  Italian  version  of  the  ‘Trolley  dilemma’ 
proposed  by  Cushman  et  al.  (2006)  while  twenty-six  to  read  an  Italian  version  of  the 
‘Footbridge dilemma’ Cushman et al. (2006). The participants responded to the scenarios in a 
questionnaire format. They indicated the moral permissibility of one of two courses action to 
be taken by the agent by ticking a box at the end of the story. The presentation orders of the 
alternatives were counterbalanced across participants. 
Results and discussion
In Greene’s version of the dilemmas 1 participant (0.7%) judged as appropriate to do the 
action in the Footbridge scenario (pushing the stranger on the tracks), while 14 participants 
(93.3%) judged as appropriate to do the action (switching the direction of the trolley) in the 
Trolley dilemma. The differences were statistically significant,  2 (1, N = 30) = 22.5,  p  < 
0.001.  In  Cushman’s  version  of  the  dilemmas  4  participants  (15.4%)  judged  as  morally 
permissible  to  do the  action  (showing the  man),  while  26  participants  (100%) judged as 
permissible do the action (switching the direction of the trolley) in the Trolley dilemma. The 
difference was statistically significant, 2 (1, N = 52) = 38.1, p < 0.001. The way participants 
answered  to  the  dilemmas,  proposed  in  Greene  and  Cushman  versions,  did  not  differ 
statistically, Fisher Exact Probability Test, all p’s >.36.
As shown in Figure 3.1, the data from Experiment 9 give support to the documented 
asymmetric  pattern  of  answers  found in  previous  studies  on  adults  (Greene  et  al.,  2001; 
Cushman et al., 2006), showing that the Trolley and the Footbridge dilemma seem to elicit 
different types of cost-benefit evaluation. 
Picture  3.1.  Percentages  of  adults  advocating  intervention  in  the  footbridge  and  trolley 
dilemmas in Experiment 9
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In  Experiment  10  the  participants  were  given  a  version  of  the  Trolley  and  the 
Footbridge dilemma suitable for children. This was done particularly in order to have the 
possibility to compare children and adults on the same type of tasks.
3.1.2 Experiment 10: ‘Utilitarian judgment in stories suitable for children’ 
Similarly to the Experiment 9, in the following Experiment adults were given a version 
of the dilemmas with an implicit test question (based on Greene proposal) and an explicit 
version of the test question (based on Cushman proposal).
Method
Participants
The adult sample included 56 participants (23 female,  M = 41.53,  SD = 10.6 years, 
ranging from 22 to 71 years). 
Procedure 
Participants  were  divided  into  four  experimental  groups  that  result  from  the 
combination of two types of test question (morally implicit vs morally explicit) and two types 
of dilemmas (Trolley vs Footbridge). Twelve subjects were asked to read an Italian version 
suitable for children of the ‘Trolley dilemma’ while sixteen subjects were asked to read an 
Italian version, suitable for children, of the ‘Footbridge dilemma’. The test question, in both 
scenarios, was morally implicit (see Experiment 11). 
Twelve  subjects  were  asked  to  read  an  Italian  version  suitable  for  children  of  the 
‘Trolley dilemma’ while sixteen were asked to read a version suitable for children of the 
‘Footbridge  dilemma’.  The  test  question,  in  both  scenarios,  was  morally  explicit  (see 
Experiment 12). The participants responded to the scenarios in a questionnaire format. They 
indicated the appropriateness of one of two courses action to be taken by the agent by ticking 
a box at the end of the story. The presentation orders of the alternatives were counterbalanced 
across participants.
Results and discussion
When the test question was morally implicit, 5 participants (31 %) choose the option 
‘do  the  action’ in  the  Footbridge  scenario  (pushing  the  fat  man  on  the  street),  while  11 
participants (91%) choose the option ‘do the action’ (switching the direction of the ball) in the 
Trolley dilemma. The difference was statistically significant, 2 (1, N = 28) = 10.2, p < 0.001. 
When the test question was morally explicit, 5 participants (31%) judged right to do the 
action (pushing the fat man on the street), while twelve participants (100%) judged as right to 
do the action (switching the direction of the ball) in the Trolley dilemma. The difference was 
statistically significant, Fisher Exact Probability Test, p < 0.001. 
The adult’s answers did not statistically differ in relation to the type of test question 
(morally implicit or morally explicit) nor for the version of the story (suitable for adult or for 
children), Fischer Exact Probability Test, all p’s > 0.17.
Experiment 10 show that the versions of the trolley and footbridge scenarios suitable for 
children seem to provoke an asymmetrical evaluation on adults’ judgment similar to the one 
observed in Experiment 9. Kipping this in mind, the second part of the study has the aim to 
evaluate the way in which children answer to the footbridge and trolley dilemma.
3.2 Utilitarian moral judgments in young children
3.2.1 Experiment 11: ‘What John should do? 
Method
Participants
These were 93 children divided into age groups: 15 3-years-olds (6 girls) aged between 
36 to 44 months (M = 40.8 months, SD = 2.4), 29 4-years-olds (9 girls) aged between 48 and 
59 months (M = 54.9 months, SD = 3.3), and 49 5-years-olds (23 girls) aged between 60 to 71 
months (M = 65.6 months, SD = 3.5). One other 4-year-old was excluded because of severe 
problems  in  language  comprehension.  The  children  in  our  studies  attended  kindergartens 
located in middle class urban areas. All received informed parental consent for participating. 
No child participated in more than one experiment. 
Materials and Procedure. 
Two wooden models were used to illustrate the dilemmas (Figure 3.2). 
Footbridge dilemma: The model for the footbridge dilemma was 25.5 X 30 X 37 cm in size and consisted 
of a 45° inclined plane with a straight track and a footbridge above. At the end of the track were five Lego play-
people. Standing on the footbridge were two other play-people: a small one (the main story character, John) and 
a big one (the potential victim). The dilemmas were given to the children as follows:
A big ball  is running quickly along this track [the experimenter 
demonstrated the event using the model].  On the track, there are five 
persons that do not see the ball rolling down because they are looking in 
front of them.
Control Question 1: Do these persons see the ball rolling down the 
street?
The ball is rolling down on this street and it will soon badly hurt 
five persons. John is on a footbridge between the big ball running and 
the five persons. On the footbridge, close to John there is a big person. 
The person does not see the ball rolling down because he is looking in 
front of him.
Control Question 2: Does this person see the ball rolling down? 
John knows that the only way to stop the big ball is to drop a very 
heavy weight into the street. John knows that if he pushes down the big 
person close to him, the big person will be badly hurt but the other 5 
persons will be safe. 
Test Question: What John should do? Push the person or not to push the person? Point 
to the picture showing what John should do.
Figure 3.2. Materials used to illustrate (a) the footbridge dilemma and (b) the trolley dilemma. 
(a) (b)
Trolley dilemma. The model for the trolley dilemma was identical in size but on the inclined plane a main 
track ran straight through the middle and a secondary track ran off the main one. At the junction of the tracks (23 
cm from the top of the wooden structure) was a gate (10.5 cm in length). By pulling the string attached to the 
gate,  access  to  the  second part  of  the  main track was blocked  and the ball  was  diverted  to  roll  down the 
secondary one. The main story character, Albert, was shown holding the string. Five play-people were at the end 
of the main track and one was at the end of the secondary track. The dilemma was presented as follows:
A big  ball  is  running  quickly  along  this  track  [the  experimenter 
demonstrates  the  event  using  the  model].  On  the  track,  there  are  five 
persons that do not see the ball rolling down because they are looking in 
front of them. 
Control Question 1: Do these persons see the ball rolling down the 
street?
The rolling ball will soon hurt five persons badly. Albert is near the 
street and he sees the big ball rolling down. He also sees the five persons 
that are going to be hurt by it. Albert knows that by pulling this string he 
can make the ball go into another track where there is one person. The 
person does not see the ball running because he is looking in front of him.
Control Question 2: Does this person see the big ball rolling down?
If the ball rolls onto this track, the person will be badly hurt, but the 
other five will be safe.
Test Question: What Albert should do? Should he pull the cord or 
not pull the cord? Point to the picture showing what Albert should do.
The  testing  for  the  children  took  place  in  two  sessions  lasting  approximately  five 
minutes. Half the children were given the footbridge dilemma first and, about a month later, 
the trolley dilemma. The others received the dilemmas in the reverse order. The experimenter 
asked  the  children  the  test  questions  using  a  neutral  tone  of  voice  and  illustrated  the 
consequences of each choice using two drawings. 
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses indicated that there were no significant differences attributable to 
gender of the participants, story theme, order of story presentation, or order of presentation of 
the test alternatives. As shown in Figure 3.3,  most children advocated action in the trolley 
dilemma (87%), but only a few did so in the footbridge dilemma (27%). Of the 93 children, 
11  responded  that  the  agent  should  not  act  in  both  dilemmas  and 24  said  gave  positive 
responses to both dilemmas. A majority of 57 children advocated that the protagonist should 
act  in  the  trolley  dilemma  but  said  that  he  should  refrain  from acting  in  the  footbridge 
dilemma. In contrast, only a single child showed the reverse pattern, McNemar test, 2 (1, N = 
93) = 52.15, p < .0001. 
There was no significant difference among age groups (Fisher’s exact test, all p’s > .16). 
Similarly, on the footbridge dilemma, only 5 of 16 adults (31%) judged as appropriate do the 
action of pushing a man, while on the trolley dilemma, 11 of 12 (91%) judged that the action 
of  switching  the  direction  of  the  trolley was appropriate  (Experiment  9).  Adults’  choices 
between the alternatives in the scenarios closely resembled those of the children. On either 
dilemma,  there  were no significant  differences  between children and adults,  Fisher  Exact 
Probability Test, p’s > .14).
Figure 3.3. Percentages of children in each age group and adults advocating intervention 
in the trolley and footbridge dilemmas in Experiments 11 and 9.
These results closely resemble those found in adult studies (e.g., Greene et al., 
2001; Cushman et al., 2006). However, it may be suspected that the moral aspect of the 
test question is implicit in that the children in Experiment 11 were not overtly asked to 
indicate choices as right or wrong but rather than a generic question concerning what 
the protagonist should do. Possibly, the similarity with adult performance may reduce or 
vanish if children were asked more explicitly to say whether the hypothesized action 
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was right or wrong. Therefore, Experiment 12 assessed the robustness of the effects 
found in Experiment 11 under different testing conditions.
3.2.2 Experiment 12: ‘What is the right thing for Jonh to do?’
Method
Participants
These were 62 children: 21 3-year-olds (11 girls) aged between 41 and 47 months (M = 
44.8 months, SD = 1.8), 19 4-year-olds (13 girls) aged between 48 and 59 months (M = 53.5 
months,  SD = 3.9), and 22 5-years-old (18 girls) aged from ranged from months 60 to 71 
months (M = 65 months, SD = 3.4). The children in our studies attended kindergartens located 
in middle class urban areas. All received informed parental consent for participating. 
Procedure
The procedure was identical to Experiment 11 except, as in Cushman et al. (2006), the test question for 
the footbridge dilemma was more explicitly focused on the moral value of the action, ‘What is the right thing for 
John to do? To push the person or not to push him? Point to the picture showing what it is right for John to do.’ 
For the trolley scenario, the corresponding question was, ‘What is the right thing for Albert to do? To pull the 
cord or not to pull it? Point to the picture showing what it is right for Albert to do.’ The order in which the two 
possible response alternatives were mentioned was counterbalanced across children. 
Results and Discussion
Preliminary analyses indicated that there were no significant differences attributable to 
gender of the participants, story theme, order of story presentation, or order of presentation of 
the test alternatives. The results were very similar to those in Experiment 11 and, again, were 
consistent with the principle of contact (Cushman et al., 2006) and the personal/impersonal 
distinction  (Greene  et  al.,  2001).  As  shown  in  Figure  3.4,  most  children  advocated 
intervention in the trolley dilemma, but only a few of them did so in the footbridge dilemma 
(88% and 25%, respectively). Of the 62 children, 7 gave negative answers in both dilemmas, 
16 gave positive answers in both dilemmas, 39 responded that it was right to act in the trolley 
dilemma and not  to  act  in  the  footbridge  task,  and  no  child  showed the  reverse  pattern, 
McNemar test, 2 (1, N = 62) = 37.03, p < .0001. 
The  age  groups  did  not  differ  significantly  in  their  responses  to  the  two dilemmas 
(Fisher’s exact test, all  p’s > .31). Similarly, on the footbridge dilemma, only 5 of 16 adults 
(31%) judged as appropriate do the action of pushing a man, while on the trolley dilemma, 12 
of 12 (100%) judged that the action of switching the direction of the trolley was appropriate 
(Experiment 10). Adults’ choices between the alternatives in the scenarios closely resembled 
those  of  the  children.  On  either  dilemma,  there  were  no  significant  differences  between 
children and adults (Fisher Exact Probability Test, p’s > .06).
Figure 3.4. Percentages of children in each age group and adults advocating intervention 
in the trolley and footbridge dilemmas in Experiment 12 and 10.
Advocating that it is right to refrain from acting in a personal scenario may indeed 
be due to a greater involvement of emotional processes, as suggested by Greene et al. 
(2001).  However,  the  interpretation  that  children’s  advocacy  of  intervention  in 
impersonal dilemmas reflects a utilitarian heuristic requires clarification. Rather than 
employing  a  cost/benefit  analysis,  children  may  have  followed  a  heuristic  such  as 
‘something should be done when there is a situation that places people in danger.’ This 
heuristic  would  then  be  blocked  in  the  personal  scenario  because  of  emotional 
activation  (Haidt,  2001),  but  remain  available  in  the  other  scenario.  To  test  this 
hypothesis,  we carried  out  a  third  experiment  in  which  adherence  to  a  cost/benefit 
analysis in a modified trolley dilemma should lead to the rejection of the action rather 
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than its endorsement. 
3.2.3 Experiment 13: ‘Investigating ad-hoc something must be done euristic’
Method
Participants
These were 52 children divided into two age groups: 26 4-year-olds (15 girls) aged 
between 51 and 59 months (M = 55.9 months, SD = 2.7) and 26 5-years-old (11 girls) aged 
from ranged from months 60 to 72 months (M = 66.1 months, SD = 4.4). The children in our 
studies  attended kindergartens  located in  middle  class  urban areas.  All  received  informed 
parental consent for participating. 
Procedure
In this experiment, only one story was told to the children. The story and the test question 
were  identical  to  those  used  in  the  trolley dilemma of  Experiment  12  except  for  one  crucial 
difference: the action in this modified version as illustrated by the Lego people and pictures would 
save one person but would sacrifice five. 
Results and discussion
Significantly more children overall (67%) choose ‘not to act’ than ‘to act’ in this 
‘inverted’ Trolley dilemma, 2 (1, N = 52) = 6.23, p < .05 (see Figure 3.5). In contrast to 
Experiment 12 where the large majority of children (88%) judged that it was right to act 
to save five persons by sacrificing one, a significantly smaller number (32%) of children 
in Experiment 13 judged that it was right to act to save one person by sacrificing five, 
2 (1, N = 114) = 34.14, p < .01. 
Figure 3.5. Percentages of children in each age group and adults advocating intervention 
in the trolley and footbridge dilemmas in Experiment 12 and 13.
The  age  groups  did  not  differ  significantly  in  their  responses,  Fisher’s  Exact 
Probability Test, p = .34. In sum, consistent with utilitarian cost/benefit analyses of the 
consequences, children displayed opposite patterns of responses in Experiments 12 and 
13. 
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General discussion
In  the  present  investigation,  we  tested  typically  developing  preschoolers  on  simple 
versions  of  the  trolley and the  footbridge  scenarios,  two moral  dilemmas  that  have  been 
extensively used in the recent literature on adult moral psychology (Cushman et al., 2006; 
Greene et al., 2001). We found that, like adults (Experiment 9 and 10), most children by the 
age  of  3  or  4  years  generate  utilitarian judgments  in  the  trolley dilemma,  but  not  in  the 
footbridge dilemma both when asked what an agent should do (Experiment 11) and when 
asked whether an action was the right thing to do (Experiment 12). Moreover, children did not 
simply follow a blind ‘something must be done’ heuristic in a trolley scenario (Experiment 
13). They endorsed intervention in that dilemma only when it was justified by a cost/benefit 
analysis.
Our investigation was limited in that it did not address the issue of whether the strong 
difference in the frequency of utilitarian responses given by children to the dilemmas was due 
to their reliance on the contact principle or, alternatively, on the intention principle (Cushman 
et  al.,  2006)  or  whether  it  resulted  from reactions  to  differences  in  the  story characters’ 
personal involvement (Greene et al., 2001). Another possible explanation for the pattern of 
results is that children relied on the distinction between an action that redirects a threat and an 
action that introduces a threat. Further research is required to clarify whether the similarity in 
the responses of young children and adults on utilitarian moral dilemmas reflects similarity in 
the cognitive processes and representations that underlie such judgements.
Continuity in moral cognition, as well as in other domains of cognitive and language 
development, suggests that  the development of morality is strongly canalized and may be 
based on domain-specific  developmental  mechanisms  (Dwyer,  1999;  2007;  Hauser,  2006; 
Rawls, 1971), rather than domain-general mechanisms that require elaborate theory revision 
processes (Kohlberg, 1969). However, the children tested here were aged 3 to 5 years and 
constructivist  models have been proposed for sophisticated competencies that  appear very 
early  in  development  (e.g.,  Gopnik  &  Meltzoff,  1997).  Ultimately,  the  choice  between 
competing explanations of acquisition in the moral domain will depend on a complex set of 
evidence  not  only  from  precocious  skills,  but  also  from  learnability  studies  and 
neuropsychological  investigations that will  involve both typically developing children and 
atypical  groups  such  as  children  with  autism (Hauser,  Young,  & Cushman,  2007;  Leslie, 
Mallon, & Di Corcia, 2006) or psychopathic tendencies (Blair, Perschardt, Budhani, Mitchell, 
& Pine, 2006).  

4. Conclusion and new perspective
In the introduction to this thesis, three main questions were raised concerning the nature of 
moral psychology:
1.1 What is the nature of moral judgment? 
1.2 How does moral reasoning develop?
1.3 Which are relationship between moral judgment and intentionality? 
The aim of the research reported here was to provide a bases for addressing these questions 
by (1) analyzing the relation between intentionality judgments and moral evaluation in the 
SEE as shown by children and adults, and (2) evaluating differences between children and 
adults  in  participants’  computation  of  information  on  measures  of  utilitarian  moral 
judgments  (3)  addressing  the  continuity  vs  discontinuity  issue  regarding  moral 
development.
4.1 Intentionality judgment and moral evaluations that result in the SEE
Concerning the first theme, the SEE is clearly present in young children. We based our 
research  on  previous  studies  carried  out  by Knobe  (2003a)  and Leslie  et  al.  (2006)  and 
replicated their results with an Italian sample of adults and preschoolers. The experimental 
work sought to explore conditions that determine the effect and, although our results are not 
conclusive,  these  can  help  to  offer  a  new  perspective  on  the  theme  in  demonstrating 
asymmetry in moral judgments. The crucial aspect on which both adults and children base 
their intentionality evaluations is the agent’s foreknowledge of the effect of the action.  In 
situations  where  the  agent  had  a  false  belief  (Experiments  5  and  8)  or  did  not  have 
foreknowledge  of  the  valence  of  the  outcome  (Experiments  4  and  7),  participants  often 
formulated negative intentionality judgments. For this  reason, we stress the importance of 
computing  information  on  the  epistemic  status  of  the  agent  to  produce  an  intentionality 
judgment.  As in  previous  research on the development  of moral  evaluation in  relation to 
foreknowledge (Nuñez & Harris, 1998; Siegal & Peterson, 1998), our results  suggest that 
early in life it is possible to understand and give meaning to an agent’s behavior on the base of 
his/her  epistemic  status  the  in  same  way  as  adults  (Aristotle  350/1998;  Heider,  1958; 

Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, & Doherty, 1994). 
According to Leslie et al. (2006, p. 426), ‘As 
soon as children are old enough to correctly attribute ‘not caring,’ they begin showing the 
pattern characteristic of the adult ‘side effect’ effect.’ In our research, we clarified that the 
nature of the SEE in terms of uncaring attitude of the agent. In research on adults (Experiment 
3), the SEE persists when sentences such as ‘I do not care if the environment will be harmed, 
but we must increase profits. Let’s start the new program’ is substituted with the sentence ‘I 
am sorry if the environment will be harmed, but we must increase profits’. Similarly, children 
continued to produce the SEE when the sentence ‘Andy does not care if Janine will get upset’ 
is omitted (Experiment 7). 
The surprising, counterintuitive aspect of the SEE lies in participants’ asymmetrical 
attribution of intentionality when a disavowed side effect is negative but not when it is 
positive (Knobe, 2003a). From our results, it emerges that, if the agent foreknew the negative 
side effects of his actions, participants were likely to make an intentionality attribution. In 
other words, the effect emerges if the participants are informed about the agent’s epistemic 
mental state, more than the careless attitude, of the agent. However, when participants are 
presented with ambiguous situations, in which the agent could not have foreknown the 
outcome (Experiment 4) or the agent makes declarations of uncaring (Experiment 6), about 
half of the participants attributed intentionality to the agent. As for adults, when children are 
unaware about the agent’s foreknowledge of the outcome the sentence ‘I do not care’ has a 
strong impact on the attribution of intentionality.
Now  we  come  to  the  crucial  question:  does  the  SEE  bear  merely  on  people’s 
performance with the concept of intentional action or does it cast some light on competence 
with this concept? Knobe (2006) and Nichols and Ulatowski (2007) claim that responses to 
measures of the SEE reflect participants’ grasp of the concept of intentionality. By contrast, 
others propose that the effect results from factors beyond what is constitutive of possessing 
this concept (Adams & Steadman; 2004a; 2004b; Machery, forthcoming; Nadelhoffer, 2006). 
Adams and Steadman (2004a; 2004b) McCann (2005) and Malle (2004) argue that the SEE 
result  from participant’s  misinterpretation of  the test  question.  In other  word,  participants 
could have believed that the behavior of the chairman, in the harm case, must be sanctioned, 
and for this reason is necessary to consider this act as product intentionally. 
Nadelhoffer  (2004;  2006a;  2006b,  p.  214)  proposes  that  emotions  are  biasing  the 
intentionality judgment in participants’ processing of Knobe’s scenarios. He states: ‘affective 
or emotional responses ... inappropriately bias our otherwise rational judgments.’ Machery 
(forthcoming)  suggests  the  ‘trade-off  hypothesis’ to  explain  the  asymmetrical  judgments 
related  to  the  SEE.  He  thinks  that  the  asymmetry  is  merely  a  product  of  how  people 
conceptualize the side-effect in the harm case. According to Machery (forthcoming), in the 
harm case, people take costs to be intentionally incurred in order to reap benefits and, in this 
case,  they  answer  that  the  side  effect  has  been  intentionally  brought  about.  To  test  his 
hypothesis Machery developed two new scenario, the worker case and the dog case, that are 
based on the trolley dilemma. Consistent with this hypothesis, subjects were more likely to 
judge that the agent intentionally brought about the side-effect in the worker case than the 
side-effect in the dog case, because they are more likely to conceptualize the side-effect in the 
worker case (causing the death of the worker on the side tracks) than the side-effect in the dog 
(saving a dog in addition to five workers) as a cost incurred in order to reap a greater benefit. 
Our results suggest that the asymmetrical moral judgments of preschoolers and adults 
are based more on agent’s epistemic status and somewhat less on the agent’s declarations of 
uncaring  (see  Experiment  5  and  8  on  false  belief).  These  data  show  that  intentionality 
evaluation rests on epistemic information together with the careless state. When the belief to 
produce damage is not present the intentionality evaluation does not seem to be influence by 
the valence of the effect. In our opinion, the fact that the SEE disappear when it is explicitly 
underlined the chairman does not have the belief to produce a negative side effect, seem to 
corroborate Malle’s proposal that the SEE is not changing the model on the naïve concept of 
intentionality proposed by Malle and  Knobe (1997).
We propose a model, illustrate in Figure 4.1, that better explains the SEE. The model 
shows  the  hierarchical order  of  the  information  processing  in  relation  to  intentionality 
evaluations that participants produce.
Figure 4.1 the scheme of the relation between the agent’s epistemic in terms of careless 
attitude and intentionality judgment
Epistemic status                           Present                                                Absent 
Careless                                      Yes         No                                        Yes         No
Effect                          positive   negative  positive negative     positive negative   positive 
negative 
       
Intentionality                 no            yes            no        yes              no       yes              no  
no
Judgment
4.2 Utilitarian judgments
The second theme we addressed  concerns  how children  compute  utilitarian  moral  judgments  on the 
trolley and the footbridge dilemmas. The rationalist approach (Piaget, 1932; Kohlberg, 1969) cannot explain why 
persons often evaluate that it is permissible to sacrifice one person to save five in the trolley case but not in the 
footbridge case. One candidate theory for explaining this asymmetry comes from Haidt (2001) who emphasized 
the role of emotion in determining moral reasoning. His theory maintains that intuitions and emotions are core 
aspects of moral judgment, while justifications provide only a post hoc evaluation. Often justifications cannot be 
provided at all in situations that Haidt terms ‘moral dumbfounding.’ 
While the debate over the role of intuition or justification in relation to moral judgment is ongoing, it has 
been proposed that a dual route model of unconscious emotions and deliberate reasoning regulates humans’ 
moral  life.  This is  the type of position has  been embraced by Greene using fMRI studies  of normal adults 
(Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) and 
by Damasio using brain-damaged patients (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Damasio, 
1994; Tranel, Bechara, & Damasio, 2000). Another model that seeks to explain humans’ moral ability comes 
from Hauser (2006). He argues that our moral judgments are made on the bases of principles (e.g., the Action 
principle, the Intention principle, the Contact principle) that are active but unconscious. Hauser proposed that 
using physical  contact  to  cause harm to another  is  morally worse than causing equivalent  harm to another 
without  physical  contact.  A possible  explanation for  the  trolley and footbridge dilemma is  that  the  contact 
principle guides moral judgments according to the intuitionist model during judgment, and that a process of post-
hoc reasoning at the time of justification allows subjects to deduce the basis for why they have made judgments 
(Cushman et al. 2006). 
We based our research in this instance on Cushman et al.’s (2006) and Greene et al. ’s 
(2001) studies and we extended the pattern of findings in this area with an Italian sample of 
adults  (Experiments  9  and  10).  As  shown  in  previous  investigations,  the  majority  of 
participants in our research stated that it is permissible to change the direction of the trolley 
but few stated that it  is permissible to show a man from a footbridge.  Interestingly,  even 
preschoolers  show the  same  type  of  asymmetrical  judgment  when  asked  to  evaluate  the 
footbridge and trolley dilemmas (Experiments 11, 12 and 13). Although from our data it is not 
possible  to  choose,  within  the  models  described  above,  the  one  that  best  accounts  for 
differences in judgments on the footbridge and trolley dilemmas, it appears that children and 
adults show the same pattern of answers on the footbridge and the trolley scenarios. 
4.3 Continuity hypothesis and moral reasoning 
In line with some recent studies on the continuity issue concerning the moral judgment (Hamlin, Wynn, & 
Bloom, 2007; Nuñez & Harris, 1998; Siegal & Peterson, 1998; Turiel, 2006), our data show that children seem 
to compute moral stimuli early in life producing asymmetrical moral evaluation on the trolley and footbridge 
scenarios. Moreover, children seem to analyze the agents’ actions in term of mental state and frame these in 
terms of knowledge, caring attitude and outcome. These data seem to confirm the findings in terms of an early 
capacity to compute moral information (Nuñez & Harris,1998; Siegal & Peterson, 1998) and, to some extent, 
supports the proposal that human minds are endow with an innate moral faculty (Dwyer, 2007; Hauser, 2006; 
Rawls, 1981).
However,  the  area  needs  further  studies  concerning,  for  example,  the  nature  of 
continuity in intentionality judgment and the extent to which considerations of caring and 
foreknowledge  remains  stable  with  age.  Further  research  is  necessary  to  compare  the 
development  of  a  moral  sense  in  typically  developing  children  with  children  who  have 
developmental  problems such as autism, conduct disorder or Down Syndrome. Studies of 
such  groups  may  help  to  determine  the  extent  to  which  theory  of  mind  and  emotional 
understanding plays a decisive role in moral evaluation. Another interesting theme would be 
to study the various ways in which the cultural context (Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, & Park, 
1997)  determine  responses  on  the  SEE  measure  and  footbridge  and  trolley  problems.  A 
comparison of societies that stress individualist values with those that stress collectivist ones 
is likely to lead to differences in responses on measures of utilitarian moral judgment based 
on diverse connotations of the term ‘intentionally.’ 
Moral psychology is a discipline of both intrinsic and practical interest; uncovering the 
determinants  of  moral  judgment  and  behavior  is  fascinating  in  its  own  right.  A better 
understanding of these determinants may help us to better understand what educational and 
policy interventions may facilitate good conduct and ameliorate bad conduct.
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Appendix 
Knowing Agent-Negative Outcome story
This is the story of a child named Andy and his frog/gerbil. Andy loves his frog and he wants 
to keep it always with him.
Here is a boy named Andy, and he's over at his house [pointing to the drawing]. And here is a 
girl named Janine, and she's over at her house [pointing to the drawing]. And look what Andy 
has with him, he has a [frog/gerbil- let child answer]. Now Andy loves frogs/gerbil, but Janine 
hates frogs/gerbils. Now can you remember, does Andy love frogs? Does Janine love frogs? 
Andy wants to bring the frog over to Janine's house if Andy brings the frog over, Janine will 
get upset. Why will Janine get upset? Now listen very carefully.  
Andy knows that Janine hates frogs/gerbils and that she will be really upset when she will see 
the frog/gerbil. Andy does not care if Janine will get upset. He is going to bring the frog over 
anyway.  
Knowledge control question: Does Andy know that Janine will be very upset to see the 
frog/gerbil?
Caring control question: Does Andy care that Janine will get upset? 
So Andy brings the frog over to Janine's house and she gets upset. Now I have a question for 
you. 
On Purpose test question: Does Andy make Janine upset on purpose or without wanting to? 
(Italian: Andrea ha fatto arrabbiare Gaia apposta o senza volere?)
Acknowledgment 
Questa tesi di dottorato è il frutto di un lavoro di analisi, discussione e sintesi che ha 
avuto luogo durante  3  anni.  Tale  risultato  non sarebbe stato  possibile  senza l’aiuto di  tre 
persone che hanno attivamente contribuito alla mia crescita professionale: Vittorio Girotto, 
Michael Siegal e  Luca Surian.  Il  loro aiuto e  i  loro “saperi” mi hanno fornito  un  modus 
operandi necessario per pensare e fare ricerca in psicologia. Un grazie particolarmente sentito 
va al prof Surian per avermi consentito, pur senza conoscermi, di intraprendere il percorso di 
dottorato.
Ringrazio  uno  ad  uno  tutti  i  bambini,  i  genitori,  le  insegnanti,  le  coordinatrici 
didattiche che hanno mostrato curiosità e disponibilità verso le ricerche. 
Ringrazio  Gaia  Polla  e  Chiara  Visintin  che  mi  hanno  aiutato  a  raccogliere  i  dati 
presenti in questa tesi.
Ringrazio i miei colleghi di dottorato Chiara, Rado, Davide, Alberto, Elena, Fabrizio, 
Elisabetta con cui ho condiviso gli anni del dottorato che, come ogni percorso di crescita, 
presenta le sue gioie e le sue difficoltà.
Ringrazio Anna, Massimo e Sergio, i miei familiari, così vicini, non importa quanto 
lontani. 
Dulcis in fundo ringrazio Giovanni e Marianna per essere la speranza del mio futuro.
